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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECT OF IDENTITY ON THE SUCCESS OF  
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
 
Kavuk, Ömer F. 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin 
May 2013 
 
Does identity affect the success of international military interventions? This 
thesis examines whether one of the factors determining the success of international 
military interventions is identity. Knowing identity is such a complex concept, what 
are the components of identity? Although there are multiple factors at play in the 
construction of one state‟s identity, the focus is on history, religion and language, for 
their conceptual clarity and overt influence on the decision-making process of 
governments and more importantly individuals. Therefore, the thesis will (a) develop 
a concept of identity regarding interventions and (b) provide a more thorough and 
reflexive understanding of the role and the importance of identity for the success of 
international military interventions. In order for such a study to take place, key 
concepts are explained and elaborated upon, to see whether identity is one of the 
defining elements of a successful international military intervention or not. If identity 
is found to have a significant impact, it could be expected to have an important effect 
on the way policy makers conceptualize and operationalize international 
interventions. 
 
Key Words: International interventions, Identity, UNOSOM II, Somalia, British 
military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War, Russia–Georgia War of 2008 
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ÖZET 
 
KĠMLĠĞĠN ULUSLARARASI ASKERĠ MÜDAHALELERĠN 
BAġARISINA ETKĠSĠ 
 
Kavuk, Ö0mer F. 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Tekin 
Mayıs 2013 
 
Kimlik uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin baĢarısını etkiler mi? Bu tez 
uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin baĢarısını belirleyen etkenlerden birinin kimlik 
olup olmadığını inceler. Kimliğin karmaĢık bir kavram olduğunu düĢünürsek, 
kimliğin bileĢenleri nelerdir? Bir ülkenin kimliğinin inĢasında birden çok baĢka 
faktörler olsa da bu tezin kimlik kavramının odak noktası kavramsal berraklık ve 
bireylerin ve hükümetlerin karar verme süreçlerine olan etkisi nedeniyle tarih, din ve 
dil olarak belirlenmiĢtir. Bu nedenle bu tez (a) müdahalelerle alakalı bir kimlik 
kavramı geliĢtirecek ve (b) kimliğin uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin baĢarısına olan 
etkisi üzerine kapsamlı ve dönüĢümsel bir anlayıĢ sağlayacaktır. Böyle bir çalıĢmanın 
yürütülebilmesi için ve kimliğin baĢarılı bir uluslararası askeri müdahalenin temel 
taĢlarından olup olmadığını saptamak için, esas kavramlar açıklanır ve bunların 
üstünde durulur. Eğer kimliğin müdahale üzerinde önemli etkisi olduğu bulunursa 
bunun yasa yapıcıların ve karar vericilerin uluslararası müdahaleleri 
kavramsallaĢtırma ve eyleme geçirme yollarında önemli etkisi olması beklenebilir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Müdahaleler, Kimlik, UNOSOM II, Somali,  
Sierra Leone iç savaĢına Ġngiliz askeri müdahalesi, 2008 Rusya-Gürcistan SavaĢı  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The phenomenon of foreign intervention in civil conflicts has gained special 
attention in the field of international relations (Seybolt, 2007: 1) in the last 20 years. 
This can be explained by the fact that civil conflicts significantly increased following 
the end of the Cold War and produced a greater level of interstate violence (Carment 
and James, 1993). 
It is not only this increase in military interventions that is significant. 
Recently the idea of state sovereignty has been turned on its head. When the state 
fails in its duty to protect its citizens, it is no longer left alone to deal with its internal 
affairs, a right previously ensured by norms of non-intervention (Seybolt, 2007: 1). 
In explaining this phenomenon, Teson (2001) employs a liberal stance to the analysis 
of state sovereignty and intervention, asserting that the primary role of the state is to 
protect its own citizens. This assertion is justified on the basis that “Tyranny and 
anarchy cause the moral collapse of sovereignty.” (Teson, 2001: 2) 
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1.1 The Problem 
Once a state fails not only in the protection, but also the promotion, of basic human 
integrity rights, it allows other states to become involved in its internal affairs in 
order to end this tyranny and anarchy and restore the fundamental human rights to 
the citizens under such rule. As such, it seems that the international political 
community has entered a new paradigm, where the rights of the individual take 
precedence over the rights of states. Governments are faced with the dilemma of 
choosing to focus on traditional security issues or the newly defined human security 
issues (Seybolt, 2007: 1). 
This has given rise to questions about when and how states should intervene. 
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet Republics, and Cambodia are prime 
examples of international intervention efforts. However, it can be observed that some 
of these interventions have been more successful than others. While the international 
community can boast of a few successes, such as in Georgia and Sierra Leone, the 
failure of international intervention in, most notably, Rwanda and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which lead to such horrific catastrophes, should push leading 
politicians and scholars to reflect upon the causes of successes and failures of these 
interventions. 
It is now recognized that different interventions produce different kinds of 
outcomes (Regan and Aydin, 2006). A foreign policy decision maker‟s goal in an 
international intervention is for the intervention to succeed. Decision makers should 
therefore consider what makes an intervention yield the preferred outcome. Such 
reflection is a necessity for any future operations to be devised and implemented 
more effectively and in order to maximize the possibility of success and minimize 
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the possibility of failure. In accordance with the goals set before the intervention, the 
decision maker will choose if, when and how to intervene in order to reach the 
preferred goal. “Military intervention is a financially expensive, risky, and dangerous 
endeavor. Therefore, the states must balance the expected costs with their strategic 
interests, but also with possible … benefits accruing from the intervention and the 
opportunities for success.” (Bove and Sekeris, 2011: 5) 
Studies have only recently begun to investigate the factors and conditions 
involved in a successful military intervention by an international actor. While studies 
which explore how international actors can successfully intervene and end conflicts 
within a state do exist, research has not as yet systematically analyzed the elements 
which contribute to the success of international interventions. Understanding these 
elements of intervention is important to evaluate the possible success of future 
interventions. 
1.2 Outline of the argument 
This thesis will examine whether one of the primary factors determining the success 
of international interventions is identity. Constructivists have long argued that 
identity is a determinate factor in international relations (Reus-Smit, 1999). The 
identity of the sovereign state is important, because it shapes state interests, which in 
turn, shapes foreign policy decisions and actions (Wendt, 1994). 
This thesis will define the primary factors included under the heading of state 
identity are as follows: history, religion and language. Although there are multiple 
other factors at play in the construction of state identity, this thesis will primarily 
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focus on these three for their conceptual clarity and overt influence on the decision 
making process. Therefore, the thesis will (a) develop a concept of identity regarding 
interventions and (b) will provide a more thorough and reflexive understanding of 
role and the importance of identity for the success of international interventions. 
The thesis is a systematic study of the function of identity in international 
interventions. In order for such a study to take place key concepts must be explained 
and elaborated upon. Firstly, the concepts of “intervention”, “success” and “identity” 
will be analyzed and conceptualized.   
This is an attempt to give a clear picture whether identity is one of the 
defining elements of a successful international intervention. If identity is found to 
have a significant impact, it could have significant implications for the way that 
policy makers conceptualize and operationalize international interventions. 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
Although focusing overtly on identity, this thesis will not dismiss the importance of 
other factors leading to the success of international interventions already examined 
by other scholars. Well-known and observed factors are military might, intervention 
strategies (Calkins, 2007) and characteristics of the conflict. 
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1.4 Other Success Related Arguments 
1.4.1 Military Might 
It cannot be denied that military capabilities and resources have an impact on the 
success of intervention. The stronger the military of the intervening state and the 
weaker the opposition, the more likely it is for the intervention to occur as well as for 
it to be successful (Bove and Sekeris, 2011), after all, states will intervene only when 
they calculate that success is a likely outcome because they face intervention costs. A 
strong military, alongside military and political will is also beneficial in the success 
of an intervention (Gent, 2008). It is assumed that military strength regarding 
interventions includes size and characteristics of the intervention and the military 
technology. An example of these factors at work can be seen in 2003 US intervention 
in Liberia: 
Early recognition of operational demands was central to mission success. 
Experience in coordinating humanitarian operations allowed the European 
Command to appreciate the complexity of interagency processes in such 
contingencies. Coupled with advanced technology, this recognition 
contributed to the mission‟s success.... The operation achieved all identified 
mission objectives: the intervention abated the humanitarian crisis, supported 
ECOWAS in securing Monrovia and paved the way for UN peacekeeping 
forces, thus putting Liberia on the road to peace (Bliddal, 2010). 
 
Therefore, the strength capacity of the country is an antecedent variable. 
Consequently, there are other variables which affect the dependent variable of my 
research question. 
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1.4.2 Intervention Techniques 
Intervention techniques are also a variable which affect the success of an 
intervention. The actual essence of the conflict greatly determines the form of 
intervention and its effects. The conflict could be a civil war, an ethnic conflict, a 
genocide etc. All these conflicts are approached differently, using different military 
strategies to end the conflict and humanitarian strategies to alleviate the 
consequences of the conflict. “Assessing the impact of foreign military intervention 
is not as straight-forward as it might seem. Much depends on the size of the 
intervention and its purposes” (Pickering and Kisangani, 2006: 363). Although 
highly relevant to the operation and success of interventions, these factors, amongst 
others, have been discussed at length by Dixon (1996). As such, this thesis will focus 
on a completely neglected element of military interventions; identity. 
The purpose is to broaden the understanding of all the aforementioned 
elements involved in the intervention process by investigating an unconventional 
factor, identity, and its relation to international interventions. Thus, rather than 
aiming at criticizing previous studies, this thesis instead aims to complement such 
studies, adding new depth and clarity to research on international interventions. 
1.5 Research Question 
The thesis will try to answer the following research question: does identity have an 
effect on success of international military interventions? 
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The thesis will try to argue that identity not only has an effect on the success 
of interventions, but that it has a considerable impact that cannot and should not be 
underestimated or ignored. The identity argument helped to explain the success of 
interventions in all three case studies; Russia‟s intervention in South Ossetia; the 
United States‟ intervention in Somalia; and the British intervention in Sierra Leone. 
The other arguments discussed above which focused on military might, intervention 
strategies and characteristics of conflict would fail to provide credible, valid and 
consistent explanations for these cases if used independently of identity analysis.   
1.6 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that the more similar the identity of the intervener and the 
intervened are the more likely the intervention will be successful. If the intervener 
and the intervened share a common history, religion and language, the intervention is 
more likely to succeed. 
The thesis will also provide an extensive look into this identity argument and 
offers a self-designed theory which will be applied to related intervention cases. 
Finally, it will provide a practical application for this theory, using three 
cases: Russia‟s intervention in South Ossetia; the United States‟ intervention in 
Somalia; and the British intervention in Sierra Leone. These cases will be extensively 
analyzed and the theory of the thesis will be applied to each case to see how relevant 
the theory is in practice. The three cases will not be compared but the application of 
theory in practice is an important aspect of this thesis as it will prove whether the 
theory holds. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 KEY TERMS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 International Military Intervention Literature 
Literature on international interventions has proliferated due to the increasing 
numbers of interventions in last fifty years: “between 1987 and 1992 there was a 
fourfold increase in the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in intrastate 
conflicts around the globe” (Regan, 1996: 336). Hermann and Kegley (1996: 440) 
maintain that foreign military intervention is "arguably the most frequent type of 
military force in use and under debate today.” They can be categorized as „third party 
interventions‟, „external intervention‟, „humanitarian interventions‟, „peacemaking‟, 
„peacekeeping‟, and „military interventions‟. The media has played an agenda-setting 
role by broadcasting the horrors of conflicts from Somalia to Bosnia, eventually 
leading to different forms of unilateral or multilateral military interventions 
(Boettcher, 2004: 331)  
However, since the research question is how identity affects international 
military interventions, the intervention description that we will investigate should be 
narrowed. That is why the intervention type we are looking at is „international 
military‟. 
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2.2 Success Literature 
Moreover, once the intervention type has been chosen, it is important to explore the 
concept of intervention success in international military interventions because it is a 
central aspect of the mentioned research question. Success is a relatively vague term. 
Scholars have rarely attempted to define „success‟ and some scholars, such as 
Pickering and Kisangani do not use the term „success‟ but rather „impacts of 
intervention‟. Therefore, in this part of the literature review I will be looking at a 
broad definition of the term „success‟ and possible implications of international 
interventions. 
Although some scholars did not look directly at the intervention success but 
rather at the results of an intervention and their implications for conflict resolution, 
there are still obvious implications of their studies for the topic of intervention 
success. In next section the implications of success and some other direct success 
definitions will be analyzed. 
 First of all, some scholars focus on the effect of the possibility of an 
intervention on a conflict. It is important to understand how the effect of an 
intervention or even the possibility of an intervention affects conflicts. Authors like 
Cetinyan (2002) argue that the possibility of an intervention has the effect of giving 
moral support to the rebellious party, which boosts their determination on an 
emotional level and provides them with encouragement.  
Cetinyan (2002) claims that the possibility of a rebel-favored intervention 
will boost the rebel groups in terms of their self-perception. Moreover, some scholars 
consider the identity of intervener and rebel group, discussing the potential effect of a 
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country which has a similar identity to that of the rebel group in the intervened 
country (Jenne, 2004). She underlines that the interest of similar identity in the 
intervener country and the level of interest it is willing to pursue as factors which 
may help same-identity rebel group in intervened country to get organized and give 
them the courage needed to continue standing up to their government. Therefore, the 
success of intervention is contingent on the possibility of an intervention and support 
or intervention of a state with a similar identity. Although they do not use the word 
success, it is still possible to consider these outcomes as notions of success. 
 The second important impact of military interventions which might be 
component of the success is the length of the conflict. Licklider (1995) is one of the 
scholars who tried to identify the most efficient way to end a conflict. It can be 
argued that efficiency in ending a conflict may provide basis for the term success. If 
the length of the conflict is taken as a component of intervention success, then the 
importance of an absolute military victory and how it changes the results of an 
intervention as opposed to possible battles which result even between parties should 
be noted as a defining variable in the outcome of interventions (Toft, 2003; Fortna, 
2004). 
However Licklider (1995) claims that military success may make an 
intervention successful but it depends on type of the intervention. If the intervention 
is an ethnic one than a military success may elongate the length of the conflict. This 
is why it is important to investigate other components of intervention success rather 
than just military might. Military might does not always lead to a successful 
intervention. 
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Moreover, if the intervention supports the weaker side of the conflict then it is 
more likely the intervention will be longer because it will balance out the strengths of 
two conflicting parties (Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2008). Also some 
scholars underline the importance of who intervenes, there are two different camps. 
Regan (1996) claims that intervention success will be higher if the intervener 
supports the government, while Krain (2005) argues that since the purpose of an 
intervention is to stop insurgencies then the intervener should oppose the government 
to stop the two parties killing each other. 
At this point before we get in to direct definitions of intervention success, 
Saleyhan (2008) points out an important aspect of interventions and their success. 
Saleyhan claims that before an intervention is evaluated with any conditions, it must 
be considered that the third party is most likely to intervene when the government of 
the intervened country faces a strong rebel group since a government can handle a 
weak rebel group without external support. At the same, historically, the most 
successful rebel groups are the ones who received external support because of the 
organizational and institutional disadvantages of a rebel group compared to a 
government. 
In the literature it is possible to find direct definitions of intervention success 
although they are few. Regan (1996) claims that the success of intervention is 
determined by the characteristics of the intervention strategy rather than the 
characteristics of the conflict. Regan‟s article is quite useful in terms of 
conceptualizing the intervention success. As it was mentioned in the literature it is 
common to talk about implications and results of an intervention instead of coming 
up with a definition of „success‟. Regan (1996) formulizes that „„successful‟‟ 
12 
 
interventions are the ones that manage to end a conflict before there are thousand 
fatalities and bring an end to hostilities for the next six month period. 
Although Regan‟s definition of success has a considerable amount of support 
from the key literature, it is not the only definition. Seybolt (2007) presents a 
different condition of success which is not about ending the conflict but about saving 
lives. He even offers a methodology for calculating how many lives are saved and 
how successful the intervention was. 
Moreover, success can also depend on military capabilities. “The probability 
that a given group wins the conflict is a function of the military capabilities of the 
combatants” (Gent, 2008). Therefore, success is defined as the military capabilities 
of combatants and the party with the best military will be taken as successful. 
 As such, although discussed in a few core texts, literature is considerably 
limited regarding the success of intervention. Moreover, literature is more focused on 
the question of why do states decide to intervene, leaving the question of what makes 
an intervention successful far from being answered. Therefore, my definition of 
„success‟ will take into account all the implications that are given previously in this 
section and I will try to come up with an encompassing and clear definition of 
success.  
2.3 Identity Literature 
The limited discussion of the core topic of this thesis, identity, can be attributed to 
the ongoing dominance of realism in IR, which would be against the impact of 
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identity on the intervention success. Since mainstream realist scholars emphasize the 
importance of power and take the state as the main actor, there is no room for 
identity (Morgenthau et al, 1985; Carr, 2001). Therefore, most realist literature can 
be taken as a rival argument to my hypothesis. 
Since I am examining the possible relationship of identity and intervention 
success, the other literature that must be investigated for my research question is 
identity literature, which has proliferated since the third debate in IR and the 
emergence of more critical theories of International Relations. Identity literature is 
broad and the concept of identity has many aspects which are studied in different 
disciplines such as political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology and so on. 
Therefore, while investigating the identity literature, one should be careful about 
constricting the concept according to the related research question. The concept of 
identity in my research question is not individual identity but a social and political 
identity that people assign to their own social and political groups. While 
investigating identity literature I also analyzed scholarly articles written by 
psychologists in order not to miss a related and essential part of the identity 
literature. 
While identity has been discussed in a variety of social-science disciplines 
they have neglected the related fields of psychology and social psychology, never 
incorporating their crucial research contributions into IR debates. This can broadly be 
attributed to International Relations‟ enduring state-centrism and theoretical 
isolation. Basically, identity is an element which can be observed when individuals 
engage with society. Assuming that individuals are different from each other, the 
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society which is formed by individuals is a sum of different identities and in this way 
a society represents commonalities between identities (Calhoun, 1994). 
There are two main components of identity: cultural and natural environment. 
Natural environment is the physical world which covers individuals including 
geography, climate, and vegetation. Cultural identity includes different kinds of 
social interactions such as history, language, cultural norms and even stereotypes. 
Therefore, the identity of one individual is the net influence of that individual‟s 
natural and cultural environment. Since my research question is related to 
interventions and conflicts or war, which are social interactions of humans, I will 
investigate the cultural environment as the main source of identity, and focus on the 
„social identity‟ instead of individual identity. 
The distinction of social identity is essential to make while reviewing the 
literature because even the literature of social identity is very broad. The difference 
between social identity and individual identity lies in the relationship of social group 
memberships and their reflections on one‟s identity which is also called self-
perception or self-concepts (Taylor et al, 1994; Shinnar, 2008). 
Tajfel (1981) defines social identity as “part of an individual‟s self-concept 
which derives from his or her membership in a social group (or groups) together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Taylor et al, 
1994: 140). The main social groups in societies are ethnic or racial groups, religious 
groups, political groups, cultural groups etc. Social identity is shaped by the specific 
aspects of these groups which an individual feel as they belong to. Therefore, there is 
a direct relationship between social groups and self-perception (Tajfel, 1981; Taylor 
et al, 1994). 
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 While I was building the theory on identity, I explored the social identity and 
in doing so, broadly separated the literature into two distinct themes. The first one is 
social cognition which claims that human beings categorize information and these 
categories form the individual‟s identity (Howard, 2000). The second one however, 
symbolic interaction, claims that individuals give different meanings to objects and 
events, and symbolize them. These symbols are transformed by the virtue of human 
interaction and form the social identity (Howard, 2000). 
That is why for my theory, I added language while defining identity. It has 
been discussed that individuals evaluate objects and events according to the meaning 
assigned to them instead of by their real nature (Howard, 2000). Howard (2000) also 
claims that every individual has two aspects of identity: self and social. The aspect of 
self is focused on finding differences when reaching the definition of identity, while 
for the social aspect individuals are focused on the commonalities and their places in 
society. 
The social aspect includes religion, ethnicity, social class and other broad 
categories. Thus, social categorization and the process of assigning symbols have the 
function of social positioning of an individual within the society with the help of 
these categorizations. An individual will decide on the actions he will take according 
to this placement (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Therefore, this thesis will argue that an 
individual‟s or society‟s self-categorization (ethnicity, religion and common history) 
has an effect on the actions s/he takes which may alter a greater social transaction 
like a military intervention. 
For Ashforth and Mael (1989) social identity means the leading features of a 
social group or groups reflected in a person. He defines the process of social 
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identification as the individual‟s identity based on how much s/he feels that s/he 
belongs to a specific group. My idea of taking different components of identity 
(ethnicity, religion and common history) is based on Ashforth and Mael‟s definition 
of social identity. They claim that an individual may identify him or herself to 
different social groups with differing degrees (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  
A common indication of one identifying him or herself with a group is the 
change in his/her emotions according to the said group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). 
For instance, if a person who lives in Iraq feels sad, threatened, and insulted when 
the country he lives in is involved in a war with another country (assuming that war 
is upsetting, threatening and insulting) it may mean that this person identifies himself 
with Iraq. 
Moreover, in the literature it is possible to find more specific articles on 
social identity and its components like nationalism or religion. National identity for 
example may be considered as a sub-branch of social identity but it has its own 
literature (Ellemers et al. 2002). Natinal identity is one of the most investigated and 
written about topics in social identity literature. As mentioned above, one of the most 
important elements of identity is social groups. Nations are as one of the biggest and 
most influential groups amongst social groups. Charney (2003) noted the importance 
of the feeling of national belonging in sense of one‟s identity (Tamir, 1995) and 
defines nations as the group of individuals who accept that they have a common 
culture, heritage and most of the time religion, on a specific territory they live on. 
In the literature it is also possible to see examples of how identity or in other 
words the components of social identity play an important role. Yosef and Margalit 
(1995) claim that identity conflicts lead to real conflicts between groups and even 
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nations when the political establishment does not recognize or suppresses the 
identities of different social groups (such as cultures and religions). It is because it 
clashes with an individual‟s self-perception and identification (Charney, 2003). 
In terms of interventions, it is almost impossible for a country to intervene in 
another country which shares the same nationality with intervener. There are few 
examples of same nationality having two states like North Korea and South Korea. 
However, this is not common. Therefore, although the nationality has a huge effect 
on social identity, there is a need to change and broaden the concept of identity 
beyond simply looking at nationality, and instead approaching it with other more 
expansive components: religion, language and heritage. Since these components are 
able to establish such strong bonds and conflicts between people even though they do 
not form a nation in some cases, they should not be overlooked if they are similar 
between individuals. This is why I have chosen these three components of 
nationality, which are also considered as the components of social identity (Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989), as my theory‟s main three elements of identity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
The research question states: does identity have an effect on success of international 
interventions? In order to establish if identity has an effect on success of international 
interventions the terms used in the research question must be clearly and extensively 
defined. “Identity”, “success”, and “international intervention” are the crucial terms 
that need defining before the theory could be laid down. The reader must understand 
the full significance of the terms. It must also be a definition that should be practical 
and useful for the systematic framework which will be presented in next chapter and 
which I intend to use it to analyze the cases. The definition of “identity” needs 
particular clarification, since its elements are disputed in current literature. 
The definitions of these terms include analysis from the disciplines of 
political sciences and psychology. Incorporating such definitions will provoke a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics behind those terms. For identity, which is the 
central theme of the whole thesis, it will also be necessary to classify the sub-
identities like religion, common history and languages. The thesis argues that all of 
these subcategories of identity are not only related to identity, they are essential 
components of it, further asserting that they have a causal effect on the success rate 
of international interventions. The scope of the individual impact of all of these 
19 
 
components does not fall under the scope of the thesis however; this issue is dealt 
with later on in the thesis. 
An accurate and concise definition of “success” will be conceptualized in 
order for this thesis to be able to reach a conclusion to the research question. Without 
fully defining what is meant by “success”, we cannot determine the result of the 
intervention and furthermore cannot deduce the role identity plays in this interaction. 
Although success is already conceptualized by intervention scholars as it was 
mentioned in literature review section however definitions of success are not really 
operationalized therefore I will attempt to improve it this conceptualization through 
systematic theorization. 
3.1 Identity 
The term identity involves numerous components; however, for this thesis the core 
elements of identity are defined as common history, religion and language. These 
three components are agreed to be the most prominent aspects of socio-political 
identity (Calhoun, 1994; Taylor et al 1994; Tajfel, 1981; Howard, 2000; Ashforth 
1989; Charney, 2003; Yosef and Margalit, 1995). Ethnicity is not included in this 
definition because since most of the states are based on ethnic identities, it would be 
a really rare case for a state with ethnicity x intervenes another states with same x 
ethnicity. Counter examples of these would be Arab states and however since the 
number of these examples are too few I choose to exclude ethnicity as an element of 
identity regarding international military interventions. Rather than ethnicity, self or 
personal identity is not related to the aim of this thesis. The type of identity that is 
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essential to examine and understand for this theory is that of socio-political identity, 
or rather national identity. In order to examine political identity, one should first look 
at how national identity is defined Why is this necessary? Because national identity 
is rooted in social identity. Social identity is its basis. 
3.1.1 Understanding Social and Political Identity 
Social identity is about the identification of oneself with a specific group. That 
means that they feel a part of that group. This process of identification is about 
people‟s self-conception of belonging to a group (Hogg, 2000). People identify 
themselves and other people into social groups (Ashforth, 1989). These social groups 
include religion and language. The process of identification includes “incorporating 
the other into the self” (Brewer, 2001). This means that people adopt the language 
and incorporate it into their own identity. 
Once people feel identified with a group they tend to share a big portion of 
the characteristics of that group. If a person feels identified with a religious affiliation 
such as Catholic they will tend to exhibit the characteristics that are usually shown 
by Catholics. They will share their ideas, values and will even accept same manners 
that they consider or know other members of that social group do. What this actually 
means is that members of a social group all tend to behave the same or similar way. 
This produces a possibility of distinction from other social groups. A Catholic 
woman will believe in different norms and behave in different ways to a Muslim 
woman. An important aspect of social identification with a group is that it is 
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positively attributed (Huddy, 2002). A member of the social group will positively 
value being a member of the group and its value. 
A crucial point that must be clarified is that the actual characteristics of the 
individuals or groups do not need to be real or created for the functioning of the 
group. This means that religious differences do not necessarily need to be stark for 
the differentiation to have meaning. The religious characteristics may be 
exaggerated, distorted or completely artificial. 
The group identity becomes an important part of the individual identity. When 
individuals identify with the group, they adopt a collective identity. National identity 
is a collective identity of a group of people (a nation). The thesis does not focus on 
the role of national identity, because it is almost impossible to find nations who are 
similar enough for comparison of the success or failure of intervention between 
these. Therefore, I selected factors that contribute to identity which are comparable 
across states: using history, language and religion. Collective identities are about 
individuals understanding themselves as being part of a whole group or as a unit with 
commonly shared features (Brewer, 2001). 
Social identity is useful for this study, because it produces the feeling of 
belonging to the “in-group”, distinguishing this group from the non-members who 
belong in the “out-group”. The members of the “in-group” have common features, 
such as language. Social identity theory looks at how the different social groups 
interact and are formed through these processes of inclusion and exclusion. Together, 
these individuals feel different from the members of the “out-group”. As stated 
above, the members of the “in-group” will evaluate their identity as being positive 
and the identity of the “out-group” as negative (Shinnar, 2008). Therefore, the French 
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will evaluate their language as something good, something to be proud of, although 
one can argue that French is not necessarily better than any other language. 
Social political identity is how one's self perception in the social realm and 
society is shaped by historical understanding, religious beliefs and language. How all 
individuals in a specific region come together as a unified group is where the 
importance lies for this thesis. Through this cohesion, independent states are created 
with their own beliefs and languages and through common history. This unity 
between certain peoples can create alliances of similar groups, but also hostilities. It 
is crucial to analyze the relations within shared identity groups as well as between 
different identities. 
3.2 History 
In what way is history related to identity? History is a part of every individual, 
because it is engrained in their memory or perception of memory about their own 
identity, the identity of the community, nation, or region. History of an individual and 
one‟s identity are in a symbiotic relationship. They influence each other. They work 
together to create and maintain certain societal and personal truths, which are 
subjectively defined (Gillis, 1994). 
In the way that an individual produces a self-concept, so can a society. They 
can also have a shared concept about other nations and societies. This is a crucial 
component of identity. History plays an important role in this self-definition of a 
social or political entity and in turn, its identity. 
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3.3 Religion 
Religion is considered as another important element. “Religions often serve 
psychological basic human needs more comprehensively and potently than other 
repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction and maintenance 
of individual and group identities” (Seul, 1999). Although it is difficult to measure 
who is religious and who is not, religion still appears as one of the most important 
components of identity for certain individuals and groups. It is also more binding in 
terms of acting collectively than language. History shows that religious identities 
tend to be the upper identity for individuals. Especially when it is compared to 
language, since religion offers a life style and set of rules, it seems like it is a more 
important identity component depending on the individual‟s belief level.  
3.4 Language 
Language is related to individual perceptions. Herder and Bunge (1993) characterize 
language as the genius of a particular people, which means that language is 
connected to mentality or way of thinking. “Language imparts a certain way of 
seeing, feeling, and even, perhaps, behaving” (Gade, 2003: 430). Therefore, language 
and language systems may create different understanding and differences between 
identities (Edwards, 1985). 
Since these components are able to establish such strong bonds and conflicts 
between people even though they are not enough to form a nation in some cases, they 
should not be overlooked in cases of international interventions if they are similar 
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between parties. This is why I have chosen these three components of identity as my 
theory‟s main three elements of identity. 
3.5 International Military Intervention 
For this thesis, international intervention is defined as “the deliberate act of a 
nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an 
existing controversy” (Staff, 2006). What this quote means is that a state‟s foreign 
policy decision makers have an intention of becoming involved in a conflict that they 
were previously not involved in. The means of becoming involved are militaristic 
and strategic. The purpose of the intervention may be ceasing violence between two 
conflicted parties through militaristic tactics with the end goal of bringing stability, 
peace and order to the state/region or to make one side victorious by supporting this 
side in its fight against the other. This is predicated on the idea that a conflict had 
already been initiated between two or more parties within a state or region. 
For the purpose of this thesis, only conflicts that occur within one state will 
be examined. This means that conflicts like wars which both of the states are 
attacking each other will not be observed. Small, Singer and Bennet (1982) classify 
intrastate conflicts based on three criteria: (a) that they take place within the internal 
boundaries of a state, (b) that one of the combatants be the government in power, and 
(c) that the opposition has the ability to offer sustained resistance (Regan, 1996: 
338). The parties involved will therefore be different groups or factions existing 
within the state of conflict in the intervened state. One of these groups may be the 
ruling government with formal legal authority. It also has a monopoly over the 
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legitimate use of force. For whatever reason, those groups are no longer able to 
coexist and cooperate and that divides between them have widened to such an extent 
that a conflict arose. 
Once an international actor has intervened, we can use these definitions to 
more easily identify whether the case-study is an intervention rather than a war. The 
distinction between war and intervention lies in the motives and involvement of the 
intervener actor. An intervention here can be defined as a third-party that has no 
direct involvement in the original conflict, be it interstate or intrastate conflict, but 
seeks to cease the violence of the conflict or change the situation for the favor of the 
party it wants and not necessarily resolve the underlying issues or become involved 
in it in a deeper sense. In other words, for an intervention there should be a 
conflicting situation for the intervened. A war can be distinguished by the third-party 
having direct involvement in the original conflict and is therefore a party in the 
original conflict. In a war, the involved party could be categorized as a second party 
involved in the conflict rather than a third. 
3.5.1 Methods of Intervention 
Intervention can be characterized by one or more of the following methods of 
intervention: economic, diplomatic and military. For this thesis, military intervention 
is the main intervention strategy examined. Reasons for this include direct contact, 
which identity can thus directly affect the success or failure of the intervention. 
Because of this direct contact, military intervention is the most extreme of the three 
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types of intervention stated above and therefore, argued by this thesis to be the fullest 
expression of the numerous elements of a third-party intervention. 
This thesis realizes that the definition of military intervention can be nebulous 
and therefore identifies military presence as deploying soldiers, using aircrafts only, 
as in not physically on the ground, and sending military experts and training to one 
side‟s army. Thus, military intervention is the focus of this thesis due to the direct 
contact it facilitates within the conflicted region and therefore, its immediate effect, 
whether successful or unsuccessful. 
The methods posed by the purpose of an intervention poses three methods can 
be achieved through military means. An international intervention aims to either 
support the government party, the rebel party or to create a buffer region to cease 
fighting from both sides (Regan, 1996). It is not necessary for the intervener to 
resolve the original problem for a successful intervention, but aims only to cease the 
violence in the conflicted region and/or turn the situation in favor of one party. This 
is the definition of third-party intervention that will be used for this thesis. 
3.6 Success 
The term “success” must also be defined properly for us to be able to measure 
the outcome of the intervention. This thesis adopts Regan‟s approach in his article 
which states that an international intervention aims to “bring an end to the violence 
associated with the underlying dispute” and “ensuring political stability in a specific 
region of the globe” (1996: 340). 
27 
 
This is a general definition for success that deals mostly with the motivations 
of the third party‟s intervention. These motivations, as stated by Regan are “territorial 
acquisition; regional stability; protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic, or 
military interests; ideology; and the upholding of human rights have all been 
identified as goals of intervention” (Regan, 1996: 340). In this definition success is 
determined by the aim of the intervener. In this aspect of a successful intervention, if 
the intervener achieves its goals harbors its original motivations for the intervention, 
then it is a successful intervention. 
I have chosen to define success in such a way as to make it easier to 
determine whether an intervention is successful or not. The objective measurement 
use is the number of casualties from the start of the intervention. An external 
international effort aims to cease the conflict and bring peace and stability. After the 
intervention begins, the number of casualties is expected to drop. If the death toll 
does not drop than it is hard to consider the intervening effort a success. 
Within these aspects of intervention, whether military, political or economic 
intervention, success for this thesis is defined as the realization of goals for the 
intervening party as it correlates with its original motivations for intervening in the 
conflicted region. 
The number of casualties should be under 1,000 from both sides if the 
intervention should be considered a success. The time period for this is from the start 
of the intervention until the time when intervener leaves. A number of deaths arising 
from the conflict should remain low for a long period of time. After all, interventions 
usually do not last years or decades. The intervening state incurs costs related to the 
intervention. 
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If the number of casualties is higher than 1,000 deaths arising from the 
conflict then the intervention cannot be considered successful (Regan, 1996: 341). 
Simply using common sense we can tell that such a high number could not possibly 
mean that the intervention pacified the conflicting states and brought peace, order 
and security. Regan also sets the goal of a military intervention as stopping the 
fighting “on terms favorable to the intervener and, in doing so, to bring stability to 
the region” (1996: 341). A number higher than 1,000 deaths means failure of the 
intervention as it could not correspond to bring stability to the region. 
Aspects affecting the success of an intervention have already been mentioned 
in the thesis and are as follows; identity of the parties, military capabilities, economic 
and financial resources, intervention strategies and the nature of the conflict. One 
method for success for intervention is through military means, “by orchestrating a 
cease-fire or facilitating the defeat of the opposing group” (Regan, 1996: 340). 
Success will be determined within the definition of this thesis if the intervener 
is able to achieve all of the original goals of his proposed intervention. Aside from 
this primary definition of success, the reader would do well to bear in mind the 
following important sub-factors of the intervention: the number of casualties 
involved; the duration of the conflict; and the ability to end the conflict. Therefore, a 
successful intervention should be expected to be one that achieves the goals of the 
intervener with relatively low casualties, and is able to put a stop to the conflict 
within approximately six months. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this thesis is that of research and case-study. After an 
extensive research from scholarly journals, documentaries and current event news, 
this theory has developed an aim to decrease gaps in intervention literature. In order 
to apply this theory, a case-study methodology will be used to analyze the positive 
and negative outcomes. Useful aspects of a case-study provide data from real-life 
situations to provide context to this theory and give empirical data. Critics of this 
method question the reliability of one case-study rather than comparative data 
through multiple case-study research. As such, theory will be applied by three case-
studies in order to increase the reliability of this theory and legitimize the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of this theory. 
A case-study is defined as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1992). This holds great 
importance when constructing theoretical works as well as testing them because it 
facilitates observable evidence from which conclusions can be drawn. Without real-
life context, there can be no empirical data with which to apply a theoretical 
framework. 
While the methodology provides great insight and understanding with a 
practical application, there are still shortcomings to this method. As stated above, this 
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theory will be applied to three cases. While these case-studies were specifically 
chosen for their apparent contrasts, there is still a great limitation when applying a 
theory to only three case-studies. Due to lack of time and resources, it must be 
acknowledged that flaws exist within the overall application and analysis used by 
this theory. 
There are many different possible research methods which can be used to 
analyze my research question: how does the identity of intervener and intervened 
affect the success of an intervention. Case Study, process tracing, and historical 
analysis are the research methods which I will discuss their compatibilities with my 
research question. 
4.1 Case Study Method 
The case study method is a very detailed investigation of a historical event to 
test social explanations, which also can be applicable to other events as well. Using 
the case study method the thesis aims to see if the theory is applicable or not. 
Investigating all the aspects of these events will help to provide an arguable evidence 
of causal mechanisms. Therefore, the case study method will also provide a clear 
explanation of causal mechanism between my variables; the identity of intervened/ 
intervener and the success of the intervention. To further the explanatory power of 
this theory, I will use the case study method. 
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4.2 Other Possible Research Methods 
4.2.1 Historical Analysis 
Historical analysis is simply based on reconstruction of past events and 
interactions between parties. It tries to explain these events with the widest range of 
information available at the present time, rather than at the time of the intervention. 
Besides a larger portion of information, we will also have hindsight regarding the 
interpretation of the meaning and significance of events after they have taken place. 
In the historical analysis method, finding causality between past events, 
theory application to these events and investigating the reasons of past events are the 
main tools of any researcher. In other words, historical analysis method offers an 
understanding of reasons behind the occurrence of events. In my research I will not 
use historical analysis method in order to show the correlation between events 
because my hypothesis can be proved by other means which are more persuasive 
than historical research. The thesis is not looking for an understanding of why an 
event happened but the theory is designed to be applicable to various cases. My 
research question will be specifically focused on the three cases mentioned above; 
therefore, the historical events and a general understanding about these conflicts will 
be given as a historical background section. However, a detailed historical analysis is 
not necessary since I will be able to conduct an application of my theory on these 
conflicts without one on the basis I do not believe that historical analysis is a 
sufficient enough method to investigate my hypothesis. 
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4.2.2 Process Tracing 
Process tracing is another possible method this thesis could employ. It is a method of 
analyzing causal processes. It provides a link between historical explanation and 
causal mechanism of the historical event. It is a good method to explain individual 
cases and moreover, it is good to analyze events and explore causal mechanisms. My 
research will be based on a case study which will allow me to apply the theory on 
three different examples and compare them in terms of my theory. Since the theory 
does not offer a holistic understanding on intervention success but a complementary 
one by only considering identity as a variable, during the research I expect to 
encounter other factors that influence the success of international intervention. 
Although I accept the effect of these components, this thesis will offer an alternative 
and complementary explanation. Which means it would be difficult to analyze the 
causal processes without including every factor that affect intervention factor. 
Therefore, case study will be a better method for this specific research in order to 
evaluate if identity has an effect on success or not, instead of process tracing.  
4.2.3 Field Research 
Field research is an efficient mean to collect data in order to test hypotheses and/or 
come up with a hypothesis to explain social political phenomena. If there is no data 
available for the research, field research might be the only way to provide evidence 
for any argument. Applying field research is neither necessary nor possible in this 
case. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, I do not have enough financial 
resources be able to visit the places. Secondly, there is enough available data to 
33 
 
provide an empirical basis for my argument in the literature and in other sources such 
as CIA fact book and Joshua Project. The third reason is, my hypothesis does not 
necessarily require field research since I will be looking at apparent identity traits 
such as religion, language and historical events. 
4.2.4 Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is a way to analyze qualitative information about social 
phenomena. Analyzing the discourse helps to reveal the ideas and events which are 
socially created by the society. Simply, discourse analysis offers a technique of 
examining qualitative objects such as texts, speeches, and language in order to 
understand the meanings of social reality. A discourse analysis could be applied to 
the independent variable of my hypothesis. Identities and how people perceive each 
other could be investigated by examining speeches and texts produced by both 
intervener and intervened. This would deepen my argument, however, since it only 
involves my independent variable it will be employed as a complementary method, 
used in conjuncture with the case studies. With my limited time, it is better to apply a 
method which covers my argument as a whole, but in future if it is possible I would 
like to apply a content analysis to deepen the understanding of identity of my 
argument.  
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4.3 Selection of Case Studies 
In order to address the research question, „How does the identity of the intervening 
actor and the identity of the actor affected by the intervention determine the 
intervention‟s success,‟ this thesis will examine three case studies. Based on the lack 
of current resources, it will only address three conflicts and the connected 
interventions. First, it will analyze the Russian intervention in South Ossetia. 
Secondly, this thesis will analyze the British intervention is Sierra Leone. Thirdly, the 
thesis will look into the UNOSOM II (US controlled and UN sanctioned forces and a 
unified Task force) in Somalia. 
These cases have been deliberately chosen to shed light on the role of identity 
within the clearly defined and delimited scope of this thesis. Two of these 
interventions can be classified as success and one can be classified as a failure based 
on the aforementioned definition of a “successful” as follows. The thesis will attempt 
to analyze if identity played a significant role in this outcome, alongside other 
factors. Specifically, in the case of Somalia, the thesis will look into the aspects of 
the conflict and intervention to determine if identity was one of the reasons which 
lead to the failure of the intervention.  
Furthermore these interventions have been chosen strategically. The thesis 
will be able to present two successes and a failure. Additionally, it allows me to 
introduce two successful interventions across continents (Europe and Africa). It will 
also permit me to conduct an analysis of two interventions occurring on the same 
continent (Sierra Leone and Somalia). I believe using cases from Africa is important 
because of Africa‟s intervention prone nature. Results of this analysis may allow 
policy makers to conceptualize international interventions in a broader way. Also, the 
intervening forces between all three cases are different in their identities: Russia, 
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Britain and the US led UN force. This will give me an opportunity not only to look at 
how these three entities functioned as intervening forces, but also at each specific 
example they represent a different type of intervener.  
4.4 Features of Interventions 
Another important subsidiary research question is: what was the relationship 
between the intervening party and the parties in conflict? The intervention is 
Somalia, which was conducted by a UN force led by the US, had legitimacy due to 
both the USA's arguable position as global hegemon and by support from the 
international community and international organizations. As the force was sent by an 
international institution, the UN, the intervention had a normative advantage by 
international law which almost entirely focuses on UN participation as the only 
legitimate form of intervention. Britain on the other hand was once a colonizing state 
in Sierra Leone, while Russia had a history of dominance in its relation to Georgia. 
Thus, all the intervening forces under observation had a very different relationship 
with the state in conflict and this could prove crucial in the analysis of the case 
studies. 
During application of the theory to cases it will be demonstrated that there is 
a linear relationship between similarities among actors (intervener and intervened) 
and the success of intervention (i.e the more similar two actors are the higher the 
success rate is). By comparing two of the most extreme examples within the 
spectrum of negative and positive interventions, this thesis will provide a better 
understanding of intervention and the theoretical framework necessary to explain this 
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concept and how it is applied. Within the case studies, all three categories of identity 
previously presented will be applied. These categories include common history, 
language and religion, and all of the applicable subset categories, such as previous 
alliances, shared or different alphabets and several other elements.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THEORY 
 
5.1 Common History 
The first component of identity which will be analyzed is common history. As has 
been stated in the literature review section, historical events and mass memories are 
significant for social identity (Gillis, 1994). Considering that identity is an outcome 
of the relationship between individuals and society and how individuals perceive 
themselves in terms of their social environment (Ashforth, 1989), the components in 
this identification process such as collective memories, historical events and current 
context between countries and their citizens are directly related to the identity. In the 
next paragraphs all possible sub factors of the common history component will be 
investigated and related examples will be given. 
5.1.1 Being under the Same Government 
Common history can be conceptualized under five different subheadings. The first 
one is having been ruled under the same government. Related parties might have 
been under the same government before and this contributes to the feeling of having 
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a common history. Since a state does not necessarily imply a united identity for all of 
its citizens it is possible that people who live under a government may still feel the 
sentiment of belonging. This kind of situation may happen between majorities and 
minorities or any other group that perceives itself different than rest of the population 
in the country but that lives under a common government. 
Moreover, the relations between different groups under one government can 
be equal or unequal. Empires are good examples of unequal relations in recent 
history. Almost all of the European empires had a ruling group, with the other portion 
of the population considered as subjects of the empire but not rulers of it. Since the 
relations were unequal, the subjects were in an inferior and subordinate societal 
position. Division between equal and unequal relations is not always easily definable. 
Different ethnic or religious groups under the same government might have different 
positions guaranteed by constitution or created naturally. Although there are 
exceptions which cannot be ignored, it is still possible to talk about privileged groups 
under empires.  As an example, the English in Great Britain and Turks in the 
Ottoman Empire can be considered as privileged or ruling groups. From the outside 
these empires are identified with the national identity of the ruling groups. 
There are also some other examples like French ethnic and cultural identities 
of different kingdoms fading away in the gradual process of state unification. 
Although individuals remember their heritage that are linked to the now provinces, it 
is hard to consider that citizens of France who live in the mainland and have same 
race and religion discriminating against each other in the same way or in the same 
intensity that they do with the individuals who are from their Empire, like the 
Algerians. 
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In the example of colonial empires, it is possible to mention another type of 
relation, which can be described as colonial relations. It is easy to discern the 
unequal patterns of relations in the governing bodies. Drawing from the French 
colonial example, it was difficult to envision a person from Ivory Cost becoming a 
state official in France not just because of identity obstacles, but also constitutional 
obstacles. Alternatively, other governments consciously tried to erode the 
significance of ethnicities, such as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As 
such, being under same government may have had a positive effect on relationships 
between groups like Kazaks and Russians. 
Obviously this does not indicate that under USSR, different ethnic identities 
had the same opportunities or that they did not clash with each other but the crucial 
difference between USSR and other governments should be underlined. The 
possibility of government type of USSR having a positive effect on relations between 
different ethnic, racial, and/ or social groups should not be ignored since in USSR 
government officials were from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. 
Therefore, for this theory it is important to understand that groups under the same 
governments can have varied relations such as imperial or colonial, and these 
relations are causal in terms of identity formation. Basically, the nature of the 
relationship will determine the potential positive or negative effect of being under the 
same government on identity and therefore, on intervention. 
This will specifically be observed under three case studies. The first is in the 
case of Russian intervention in South Ossetia and the second is British intervention 
in Sierra Leone, and US intervention to Somalia. The former will look at the 
relationship between nations living under the common government in USSR. The 
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latter will look at the colonial relationship between the colonizer and the colonized 
and the final will investigate the hegemon approved by international organizations 
intervening to a troubled African state. 
5.1.2 Having an Alliance or a War 
The second component of common history is having a shared alliance or war. Firstly, 
this thesis will examine war as a concept and a political activity. Wars are large scale 
social and political events which affect both society and individuals on a deep level. 
Wars may change the entire international and social landscape and alter identities 
completely. They also can cause social traumas which may last decades or centuries. 
An example of such extensive trauma was the anguish felt by the Germans after their 
defeat in the Great War. It leads to years of frustration and humiliation, which 
eventually provided an environment in which Nazism was able to blossom.  
5.1.3 Having a War 
Even single battles are imperative for the development of a cohesive self-perception 
in masses, as the example of the battle of Mohacs between Ottoman Empire and 
Hungary demonstrates. Given the limitations of this thesis, investigating how a war 
or battle influences identity is beyond the research scope. It would require 
completely separate research to find out if there is a direct relationship between war 
and identity formation. However, what this theory does develop upon is the idea that 
wars can remain in collective memory for a long time and may be used to mobilize 
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masses by arousing their nationalistic sentiments to either cooperate with or oppose a 
certain ally/enemy. Saddam Hussein just like many charismatic Arab leaders used 
past religious battles to provoke the intended anti-Iranian sentiments. This occurred 
in April, 1980, when he compared the Iranian rebellion in the Khuzestan province, 
which was being rapidly annexed by Iraq, to the 7
th
 Century Battle of al Qadisiyyah 
in which Persia was defeated (Zweiri and Zahid, 2009). The use of historical 
narratives based on 'high culture' was crucial for Saddam's construction and 
perpetuation of the Iranian enemy (Adib-Moghaddam, 2007). 
Thus, for wars to be utilized as a tool to mobilize masses they do not have to 
be directly related or current. Milošević used the story of Lazar of Serbia and the 
Battle of Kosovo in order to mobilize Serbs against Muslims during his Gazimestan 
speech in 1989 (Radovic, 2009). 
5.1.4 Currency of the War 
Under the topic of war the first thing to inquire into is how current the war is. The 
more current the war the easier it is to mobilize masses due to the fact that mass 
memories will be more accessible for a current war. It does not necessarily mean that 
old wars cannot be recalled but it is easier for current wars to be used as means of 
mobilization. 
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5.1.5 Results of the War 
The second component of participating in a war is the consequence of the war. 
Consequences are really important in this sense because it can be observed in history 
that big defeats tend to occupy a very large and significant part of collective memory. 
In the First World War, Germany‟s defeat became a really important component of 
the German political discourse. After the war and it was successfully used to 
mobilize masses (Johnson and Tierney, 2006: 8). History is full of many examples 
like this. 
Also, considering that wars are a prevalent characteristic of the international 
system (past and present) and some wars have found an important place in people‟s 
hearts and have gained an almost mythical status. In some of these wars countries 
incurred great losses and costs. The outcomes of wars are an important element of 
identity. 
5.1.6 Being part of an Alliance 
The second part of this component alliance/war component is being a part of an 
alliance. It is assumed that the alliance(s) of a country affects the self-perception of 
citizens. It is likely for citizens to develop a sort of trust towards the other country 
especially if they fought against a common enemy. An alliance basically implies that 
two countries have common interests. Therefore, it may be expected that in a 
possible intervention between two allied countries people‟s behavior towards the 
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other country may be more accepting than the one in which two countries have no or 
negative relations. 
Alliances can be evaluated like wars with result and time indicators. Although 
current alliances are more likely to be able to mobilize people since their 
accessibility is higher, former alliances can also be renewed. In the Second World 
War, Germany distributed propaganda pamphlets trying to convince the Dutch not to 
join the English and French in the war due to „old alliances‟. One such propaganda 
pamphlet states: “Throw away your weapons and surrender! The German Peoples 
Army has the order not to shoot and to treat you as comrades and sons of a related 
brother nation”. “We are your brothers and we want the same for you as we want for 
us. Freedom and peace!”.1 
Some social and international events are important factors in the self-
perception of countries or groups. Even some events can be considered the main 
issue for a group and determine a huge amount of their context. 
5.1.7 Having a Past International Event 
The third subtitle under the common history section is having a past 
international event or events such as holocausts, massacres, or any other type of 
economic, political, cultural conflict or crisis. It could also be positive experiences 
like: economic, diplomatic or cultural support. It does not matter how much an event 
                                                 
1
 http://ww2propaganda.eu/dutch40.htm (Last Access 22.01.2013) 
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affects a group‟s or a country‟s current situation in reality, it can have a great effect 
on people‟s perceptions and countries self-understanding. 
Groups which experienced a holocaust are a good example of this. 
Holocausts are intense and unfortunate events which affect the society and 
individuals by destroying the society and the lives of many individuals. It is not 
difficult to understand that this kind of event can cause serious traumas on groups 
long-term. Besides, the event itself does not necessarily need to happen, but it can be 
categorized as such. Public discourse or the existence of the event can be taken as a 
problem between two countries. Still, even the idea of this kind of an event is enough 
to mobilize masses and keep them “rallying „round the flag” (Baker and Oneal, 
2001). 
Continuing from the holocaust example, Jewish people from different ethnic 
backgrounds (the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim) have a common identity 
component of the holocaust experience. It appeared to be a very strong element of a 
Jewish identity after the Second World War. The Armenian example can also be used 
in this case. As Armenians spread out throughout many countries all over the world 
the idea of holocaust seems to keep their historical ties with their mother land alive 
even today. 
More than that, the perception of some social and political events may be also 
positive. Economic support given by one country to another may have a positive 
effect. As an example, USA‟s support to Europe after the Second World War through 
the Marshall Plan can be considered as something which strengthened the relations 
between these states and brought great relief after the unfortunate great war. Thus, 
while investigating common history, the following components like wars, alliances, 
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former imperial relations and/or international events should be taken into 
consideration since they have similar effects on people‟s perception toward and 
against other groups and countries. 
5.1.8 Artificial Similarities 
The fourth subtitle under the common history section is artificial similarities. 
This section may seem different because it is a widely studied phenomenon in the 
neither psychology nor international relations literatures. It can be observed that 
some countries develop an artificial sense of affection towards other countries. By 
artificial, I mean affection that is not a direct result of any interaction between 
countries. 
Certain countries develop affections towards other countries despite the fact 
that they are not neighboring countries, and they have never been in a war or any 
other significant international interaction. However, purely based on stereotypes (a 
common belief or assumption about a group‟s characteristics) an assumption of 
similarity can develop between people of two countries. In other words, the countries 
which were not involved in any serious form of interaction before have no reason to 
feel resentment, annoyance or hatred towards the other state and may in fact 
categorize them as a friendly nation. 
Japan and Turkey are a good example of this. These two countries have never 
been in a war or any other serious international interaction. Moreover, even the 
religions they represent have never clashed or interacted before. It seems like there is 
no reason for Turkish people not to like Japanese people and vice versa. Contrarily, 
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some stereotypes or beliefs like certain nations may have brought the people of these 
two nations closer. The assumed national feature of being good warriors can be seen 
as common points between these two nations. Due to this assumed artificial or 
possible similarities it is widely speculated that the Japanese nation is close to the 
Turkish nation. It can be said that these two nations mutually and positively perceive 
each other.  Thus, having no negative past interactions and also having so called 
similarities may increase the feelings of appreciation between two nations. As a 
result, it may make resistance and mobilization efforts more difficult. It can be 
assumed that people will not be eager to fight against a country that they perceive as 
similar to them in comparison to any other country which they have interacted with 
in the past. 
While theorizing the perceptions of nations towards each other, these kinds of 
assumed similarities which are not based on any real interaction should not be 
ignored. However, in this thesis the reasons for these kinds of similarities will not be, 
but it will be merely assumed that they exist between some countries. Since the 
reasons are not going to be investigated here, one cannot be sure how these assumed 
artificial similarities develop. 
The fact that there is no actual commonly shared history between them does 
not make this category irrelevant. However, this section is added because there are 
considerable amount of countries which do not have historical interactions but they 
as well do not have the perception of similarity between each other while some 
others have this perception. The fact that no tangible or observable event occurred to 
bring these states closer is inconsequential. The essence of this argument is that 
perceptions of truth and of similar identity matter. They influence the way people 
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think and act. Its power to influence behavior is significant. Thus, this subtitle is 
added to the common history section in order to present a better analysis regarding 
the relationship between intervention and identity. 
5.1.9 Importance of the Location 
The last component of the common history section is importance of the location. The 
place where parties engage in interventions may have significance in the common 
history sense, if the location has a historical background like a long lasting conflict or 
any other interaction which left a mark in memories of people. Places, cities and 
regions where one or more historical events happened or places mentioned in 
religious texts may change the context of the intervention. Important places may be 
described as holy cities which are mentioned in religious texts like Jerusalem, 
historical centers: cities which were historically capitals of big civilizations like 
Rome, places where a big or important conquests or battle happened like Istanbul, 
Vienna, and regions or cities which are contested over like Alsace Lorraine. 
Therefore, it will be meaningful to assume that mobilizing people against intervener 
may be easier if the story behind the place is resurrected. 
Moreover, the reasons which make a place important for people‟s perceptions 
are very similar with the other subtitles under history section. For example, great 
wars, defeats, and so on are investigated under other sections and yet, people‟s 
perception of a war and the perception of an important place are different. A war 
happened between two nations and can become a positive or a negative memory, but 
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those memories are not necessarily associated with a place. A war can be massive 
and it might be connected with ideologies, governments, ideas and dates. 
A place which is considered important for people is different than just the 
occurrence of an event in the history. The reasons that make a place significant for 
people are more complex than historical events. Cities like Jerusalem have a history 
that spans more than two thousand years based on both legends like stories and real 
events happened in past few centuries. Thus, an intervention in such a place would 
recall past memories and stories such as crusades, and religion-based promises of 
land. It can make mobilization efforts easier for local groups or leaders against 
interveners. 
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Figure 1: Schema of Common History 
 
5.2 Language 
The second main component of identity is language. It has been argued that language 
has an impact on social identity and even individual identity (Herder and Bunge, 
1993). Also, it has been stated that language may be one of the mechanisms of 
personality (Edwards, 1985: 430). Therefore, language is studied under various 
disciplines from psychology, anthropology to political science. As the second 
component of identity in this theory, language and its effect on the success of 
intervention might be considered simpler than common history. There are three 
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subtitles of language: using a different or the same alphabet; speaking languages 
from the same language family; and having same language. These three subtitles of 
the language component can have a positive or negative effect on public opinion and 
mobilization efforts and thus have an effect on the success of intervention. 
5.2.1 Alphabet 
Alphabet types should be the least effective language factor under this title but it also 
should not go unnoticed. It has a certain effect on identity. The Mande language is a 
good example. The region where Mande is the original language is across from 
Gambia to Nigeria. Although, official languages of these countries are French and 
English, people speak Mande and use Arabic script for writing. However, the number 
of various Mande speakers who use N‟ko alphabet (original Mande alphabet) has 
increased from the colonial through the independence periods. They state that the 
motivation to learn N‟ko alphabet is pride in their culture (Oyler, 2005: 1-12). 
Besides logographic alphabets there are approximately eight alphabets such as 
Armenian, Cyrillic, Latin, and Arabic. It is possible to classify alphabets according to 
their phonetic features however, it is not necessary to do this here. Basically, a person 
who knows symbols of one alphabet would be able to read another language which is 
written by the same alphabet. Simply, a Bulgarian person, in case of any Russian 
intervention, would be able to read Russian texts although s/he does not understand 
the content (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the languages). However, a 
Georgian person would not necessarily be able to understand Russian texts if s/he 
does not speak Russian. 
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Alphabets are added here under the title of language because of two different 
intervention cases; in one of them the intervened can read what is written in different 
communication media and in the second one the texts brought, distributed and used 
by interveners cannot be understood by the intervened. It is possible a different 
alphabet will be seen as a difference between intervener and intervened. Moreover, 
this difference can be easily understood as intensifying the divisions between the 
interveners and the intervened. It can be seen as something which will not serve in 
favor of interveners. Therefore, under the language title, although as the least 
effective category -the alphabet- should be included as a factor which is related to the 
identity of people and can affect intervention success. 
5.2.2 Language Family 
Language family is the second factor which should be investigated under the 
language section. It might be accepted that most of the time languages of the same 
language family can be different and hard to understand. However, in some cases the 
languages in the same language family are similar enough to play a role in the 
relations between countries in general and in the success of interventions more 
specifically. Thus, there are two possible conditions: either languages of intervened 
and intervener belong to the same language family or not. 
Two languages belonging to same language family will be assumed to be 
similar and to have a positive effect on intervention success. There are nearly thirty 
five different language families and some languages are very similar to each other 
while the other ones are not. Learning languages which belong to a same language 
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family might be easier. Moreover, it is expected that there are similar words and 
grammar systems between these types of languages. 
As an example, for a person who speaks Spanish it would be easier for 
him/her to understand French, rather than a German. Since there is a difference in 
interaction process between two languages which belong to the same language 
family rather than a different one, this should be taken into consideration. There are 
two ways which language family affects the perception of intervened towards 
intervener. The first one is in practical use. It is going to be easier for the intervened 
to understand and even learn the language of intervener assuming that both parties 
will be in an interaction in many areas of the intervention. Intervened will feel less 
distance between them and the intervener simply because it will be easier to 
communicate with them. 
The second one however, is about the perception of intervened. Considering 
the concept of language is essential for the essence of the nation or feeling a part of 
the community, it is possible for the intervened to feel this „closeness‟ and sort of a 
kinship between the intervener, because of similar languages. Moreover, they can 
recall past memories (assumed or not) and perceive the intervening party as 
belonging to the same nation once in the past because of the language similarities. It 
is merely an example of how languages that belong to the same language family may 
affect the perception of intervened, and therefore the effect of language family 
should be accepted. 
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5.2.3 Common Language 
The most effective factor for language section is sharing a common language with 
the intervener. Language is a very important component of identity (Edwards, 1985: 
430). Nations are mainly described as a group of people who share common 
ethnicity, culture, history and of the most important is sharing the same language. 
Language is almost the essential part for the term nation. Therefore, for one‟s 
identity, language bears the meaning of being a part of a nation or community. 
Since language is this important for one‟s social and political identity, it 
should be assumed that it will affect the intervened party‟s perception towards the 
intervener. There are two possible conditions under this subtitle: speaking the same 
language or not. In this theory it is assumed that groups who speak the same 
language may feel an affinity for each other which will undermine local actors efforts 
in mobilizing a resistance against interveners. 
Having the same language may affect the understanding of the participants 
involved in the intervention in two ways: subjective perception of the other parties 
involved and being able to communicate in practical terms. In a scenario where both 
parties have the same language, individuals from both parties will be able to 
understand each other. An uneducated person from the intervened group would easily 
be able to communicate with someone from intervener group since it is his or her 
own language. Even, in the cases when individuals do not directly communicate, the 
perception may be formed by the fact that there is a similarity between two groups by  
virtue of indirect communication such as visual and auditory propaganda made by 
intervener. 
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At this point, it should be underlined that although this theory provides a 
schema for identity all of these assumptions like such as speaking the same language 
should be investigated in detail while applying it to an intervention case. This is 
because each case could have its own unique language dynamics between the 
intervened and interveners. Therefore, in some occasions similarities in languages 
may vary. For instance, the intervened party may have two official languages and 
their second language may be shared with interveners. In this case, while applying 
the theory these types of variations should be properly examined in order to avoid 
misinterpretations. 
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Figure 2: Schema of Language 
5.3 Religion 
The religion portion of the theory is more complicated than others. Religion plays a 
different role in one‟s identity than other aspects such as nationality or regional 
belonging (King, 2003). Religion sometimes can be even more instrumental in the 
shaping of identity than the national affiliation (Weissbrod, 1983). It depends on 
person‟s religious beliefs, values, commitments, as well as the temporal and spatial 
the context of the religion itself. In any case, religion should also be taken into 
consideration while investigating the identity in terms of success of intervention. 
Such an investigation should examine the intricacies of the religion. 
The religion section can be separated into two main titles: having a different 
religion and having the same religion. Religion was something that kept people 
together and in some examples it provided people with the motivation to go to war 
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and in some other examples religion made it possible for different groups live 
together peacefully. It is known that religion has a great impact on people‟s mindsets, 
worldviews and norms. 
Especially before the French Revolution religion was the main distinguishing 
element diving people into groups. Religion has a diving potential and as well as 
integrative one. It is also a good tool to mobilize people, which is perfectly depicted 
by the crusades or Jihads. In this theory by accepting the fact that every religion has a 
different characteristic and complex set of relations between religions formed during 
history, it is assumed that if both of the parties have the same religion, intervention is 
more likely to be successful. 
5.3.1 Same Religion 
As mentioned before this section on religion might be more complex than others 
therefore it is important to investigate it further. Under the title of „same religion‟ 
there are two possibilities to be considered.  
5.3.2 Sects 
Firstly, the fact that engaging parties share a common religion does not necessarily 
lead to a positive effect. Parties may have same religion but they could belong to 
different sects which may be a serious source of conflict. In such a situation sects in 
the related case should be investigated closely to determine if there is a conflict 
between them. Their relations might be conflicting like in the example of Sunni and 
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Shiite Islam, or sects can also have neutral positions about each other. Therefore, in 
case, where the intervener and intervened share the same religion, sects should be 
taken into consideration. 
5.3.3 Characteristics of the Religion 
Secondly, if parties have the same religion and the same sect then the specialty of the 
religion should be examined: some religions may have a political and social aspect 
which could be used to mobilize masses. Religious scripts and practices vary. 
Although religion as a term can be defined generally, every religion has different 
aspects (Conkle, 1993). In this thesis, it is not going to be discussed which religion is 
more prone to mobilize people or create societal bonds but rather what is the 
difference between religions in terms of social and political implications. Moreover, 
it is possible for some countries to have large amounts of people who describe 
themselves non-religious. This should also be taken as a separate variable. 
5.3.4 Different Religions 
The second main possibility under the religion section is parties having a different 
religion. Intervener and intervened having a different religion is an important part of 
the theory. As has been stated in this thesis, religion has a power to integrate people 
and at the same time create conflicts. In mainstream religions people who practice 
other religions or people who do not share same beliefs are described using special 
terms like heathen or gavur. Religions tended to distinguish non-believers from 
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believers. Therefore, a social division between believers and non-believers was 
created over time. 
The distinctions made between across religions are significant as people tend 
to describe themselves by drawing on differences from other religions. This stems 
from psychological research done on identity where “in groups” use “out groups” to 
build up and secure their identity. The tendency to emphasize differences across 
religions can be traced throughout history. The distinctions have been deployed as a 
way of mobilizing people and as well as a source of conflict. Any aggression directed 
by one religion towards another merely for religious reasons can be a good example 
of this. 
5.3.5 Past Contact 
While exploring the relations between different religions two important aspects 
should be examined. The first one is that the related or similar religions were in 
contact in the past. It is important to investigate related religions while applying the 
theory to a case because every religion has its own past and major historical events. 
Additionally, the contact between different religions may have caused for their 
believers to have different perceptions of each other due to these positive or negative 
interactions. Thus, Christianity and Islam have a different perception of each other 
than do Christianity and Buddhism because of their common past influencing the 
constantly changing perceptions between Muslims and Christians. 
These perceptions shaped throughout history are still effective and can be 
resurrected by parties involved in the conflict or intervention. In a scenario where the 
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intervened and interveners have two different religions, any historical conflict can be 
recalled and strategically utilized. While common history can also be used to 
reawaken collective memories, religion plays a slightly different role, because there 
does not need to be a past event between the participating groups. A past event which 
happened between two other groups of states with the same religions as current 
conflicting and intervening groups can also be recalled. 
As an example, crusades happened between different medieval European 
kingdoms and Muslim polities in the Middle East and some of them do not exist 
anymore (for example Mamluks). Therefore, it is not possible to recall a historical 
event which happened between Kingdom of England and Mamluks in the recent 
times. However, the religions that these medieval kingdoms represented can be 
associated with current countries and these events may be recalled in terms of 
religion. In a similar way, the Iraqi people were able to associate the crusades with 
the recent US attempt to overthrow the Saddam regime, even though that specific 
event did not occur between the warring Iraq and USA. This is why one must 
distinguish between the common history explanations from the religion-based 
explanation.   
5.3.6 Current International Context 
The second subtitle under the different religions section is the current international 
context. It is important to investigate the current international context separately 
from past events and the historical context of the related religions in which 
interventions take place. This is because although two religions were not in a conflict 
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before, a conflict or any other interaction might be happening in the current context. 
An example may be the tense relations between Israel and Arab countries 
surrounding it. It is a different situation than the one mentioned above because 
Judaism and Islam were not in a serious conflict until the start of mass immigration 
into Palestine and intensified with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. 
Therefore, if only the historical context is investigated the current context is 
overlooked. As a result, if the intervener and the intervened have different religions 
both historical and current context should be investigated to analyze the effect of 
religion on success better.  
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Figure 3: Schema of Religion 
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5.4 Assumptions 
5.4.1 Assumption of Scale and Obscurity of Values of Identities 
Each concept previously described contains assumptions in which the effect can be 
higher or lower. There cannot be an assigned amount of effectiveness. Thus, in some 
applications, one of the elements of identity can be more effective while in another 
example it is not. The main aim is not to measure the success rate, but show that 
certain elements of identity have an effect while others do not. This thesis will thus 
investigate those elements as much as possible. Therefore, components of the theory 
may vary in terms of their efficiency on success of intervention. The differences and 
similarities of identity of the engaging parties are important in terms of creating 
public opinion and the possibility of mobilizing the masses. 
5.4.2 Assumption of Relationship of Identity and Success. 
Since the investigated aspect of intervention here is the relationship of identity and 
success, only that part of success which is related to identity should be studied. This 
part is directly related with public opinion. In other words, government is formed by 
small group of people and can be diverted easily moreover, a third party intervention 
is mostly ignoring the government of the territory. Thus, the relationship of identity 
and success is looking at the masses which are hard to control and their tendencies 
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can be seen as public opinion. The components of the theory are the ones which 
affect public opinion and therefore, international events which were happened 
between governments without any participation of public opinion should be ignored. 
As an example, any economic aid between governments if they are not announced 
are not subjects of this theory. Basically, the relationship between identity and 
success in this thesis is assumed as the ability of local groups and leader to mobilize 
people against intervening states. These local actors can be government personnel, 
religious leaders, military personnel, or any other people who represent an idea or a 
group. It is assumed that local actors have an ability to mobilize masses to different 
extents. This theory claims that the extent of mobilization -although there are other 
reasons- is affected by the identities of both sides intervening and intervener. 
Therefore, a mapping of possible identity interactions between parties will be useful 
to understand the effect of identity on mobilization of masses and therefore success 
of intervention. 
5.4.3 Assumption of Relationship between Resistance Shown by Intervened and 
Success of Intervention 
The more the locals show resistance the less the intervention is successful. Since the 
success is defined as stopping the fight at least for six months if intervened people 
resist against interveners then it is highly possible that they attack or take any action 
against intervening countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that for an intervention to 
be more successful, besides other components of intervention like military power and 
the type of intervention, identity is an important element. If the identity of intervener 
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and intervened are similar this is going to decrease the ability of mobilization for 
local actors and therefore, increase the success of intervention. 
5.4.4 Assumption of the effect of identity on success 
After an example is investigated by the virtues of this theory, estimations can be 
made on the success of the intervention however, the aim of this theory is not 
providing a measurement system but simply underlining that identity has an effect on 
the success of intervention. Moreover, this theory also does not provide a holistic 
interpretation of interventions but merely examines the identity and success 
connection. Thus, any estimation can only be made in terms of identity however; it 
will be impossible to present a certain prediction due to the obscurity of values of 
identity as it was mentioned in assumption of scale section. 
5.4.5 Assumption of order of factors which affect intervention success 
Intervention success depends on many factors including intervention strategy or 
motives. In this thesis, it is investigated that if identity is one of these factors which 
affect intervention success. Therefore, while investigating the effect of identity on the 
success of intervention firstly and mostly it should be assumed that intervention 
success depends on other factors such as the military and economic power of the 
intervening country, and intervention strategy. However, what is tried to be shown 
here is that the success is not merely depends on these but also identity. Although this 
is true that the range or amount of effectiveness of factors including identity cannot 
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be determined within this research, but nonetheless if it is effective or not can still be 
determined. Thus, an order between factors, the importance or strengths, which 
affects the success more, will not be provided. However, what will be presented is 
that there are some factors that affect success and identity might be one of them. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
APPLICATION 
 
 
 
In this section all three cases will be analyzed using the theory explained in the 
previous chapters. Firstly, a background of the conflict will be given with historical 
facts, important actors including individuals, organizations and governments. 
Secondly, sections of the theory as it was mapped will be applied to the case in detail 
in order to make a connection between the success and identity. 
6.1 Russian Intervention in Georgia 
6.1.1 Background 
Beginning of the year 1999, Russia intervened between the two warring regions of 
South Ossetia and Georgia. Although there are still minor aggressions between the 
two nations, the intervention is generally considered successful. By focusing on the 
series of events leading up to and during the Second Georgian war, one can 
understand how deeply rooted the relationships between the three nations is. As the 
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conflict drew to an end in 2008, South Ossetia gained independence with the 
successful support of the former Soviet Union.    
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Georgia and 
South Ossetia exploded when the small province of South Ossetia requested 
autonomy from Russia and Georgia in 1989 and looked to the Georgian Supreme 
Soviets to consider and resolve the issue (Niedermaier, 2008: 3).  This was outright 
rejected by Georgia and caused fragmentation and disintegration of the country and 
the ethnic territories within it.  In September 1990 South Ossetia declared itself to be 
a Soviet Democratic Republic within the USSR and in response, Georgia ambushed 
South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 2008: 13).  Georgian violence forced South Ossetia to 
proclaim a “state of emergency” from hotbeds of ethnic conflict. After Zviad 
Gamsukhurdia came to power, he declared Georgian independence from the USSR, 
and blockaded Tskhinvali; the South Ossetian capital (Niedermaier, 2008: 
24).  Eighty thousand South Ossetian refugees poured into North Ossetia and began 
affecting Russian politics.  President Yeltsin was forced to support South Ossetia to 
maintain support from the people. 
During this time, Georgia began participating in Soviet elections.  One 
hundred-thirty parties were contesting the election of the Georgian Parliament and 
were striving for independence. The Communist Party, attempting to hold onto 
power, was the most strident of these parties.  Each party maintained its own 
paramilitary units who were not loyal to the state.  Zviad Gamsukhurdia became the 
first president of Georgia because he spoke out against the USSR and earned respect 
as a national hero who told the truth.  However, he soon came under siege by the 
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Georgian people because of his dictatorial behavior and was then replaced by Eduard 
Shevardnadze after a coup. 
Although in June 1992, both Georgia and South Ossetia signed a ceasefire 
protocol specifying mutual agreements on ceasefire, both forces harbored aggression 
as Russia placed an economic blockade on the pipeline and military highway that 
pass through South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 2008: 43).  This form of peace talks, 
amidst violence between the two regions, continued throughout the rest of the first 
war.  A state of emergency was declared in South Ossetia from Sep. 30 1993 ... effect 
until Jan 31 1994 (Niedermaier, 2008: 55).  Peace talks again occurred in 1994, but 
essentially were not helpful because although the first war ended after these talks and 
the state assumed its position of having a monopoly on violence, the second 
Georgian war broke out only four years later. 
During this time of peace between Georgia and South Ossetia, Shavardnadze 
began thawing relations with the United States.  On account of communist paranoia, 
the geopolitical policy of the U.S. was to prevent Russia from rebuilding the 
USSR.  This could also give the U.S. an advantage because Georgia could be made a 
buffer state and also they could secure a pipeline to receive Caspian oil.  In 1999 
Georgia requested to join NATO, but was denied based on a requirement for all 
NATO members to have defined borders. 
Also, in 2002 the South Ossetian president began expanding the army by 
organizing as many as 3,000 reservists and volunteers (Niedermaier, 2008: 101). 
While South Ossetia considered joining the Russian Federation, in 2003 Putin urged 
the new Georgian leaders to accept Russian terms of normalization. 
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In 2003 the Rose Revolution took place in Georgia, overthrowing 
Shevardnadze, after he rigged the elections.   In 2004 Georgia elected the youngest 
European leader, 36-year-old Mikhail Saakashvili.  He was a neo-liberal interested in 
privatizing the market and was a strident nationalist.  He replaced the government 
flag with the flag of his party and also added a flag of the European Union.  The new 
president encouraged further incorporation into NATO, but did not want to allow 
U.S. bases in Georgia.  He promised to resolve the issue of autonomy with 
diplomatic talks, but continued military actions stating, he would never see the 
breakup of Georgia (Niedermaier, 2008: 135).  
South Ossetia then joined forces with Abkhazia (another small Eastern 
territory under the attack by Georgia) in fighting against Georgia.  Both regions have 
many commonalities including that both areas have a government based on 
smuggling and contraband, both have elections that are not recognized by Georgia, 
and both are trying to become autonomous and separate from Georgia. Kokoity was 
elected the South Ossetian president and demanded “compensation in the amount of 
$30 billion” be made to the government for war casualties and damages 
(Niedermaier, 2008: 143).  The Georgian government ignored this request and 150 
Russian trucks filled with weapons entered the Tskhinvali area” (Niedermaier, 2008: 
144).  Colin Powell unofficially vowed to talk to Russia on behalf of the Georgian 
PM, after Georgian Ossetians seized troops.  The Georgian/Russian conflict 
continued as Georgian troops confiscated missiles from Russian peacekeepers on 
their way to South Ossetia.  Georgia also accused Russia of siding with South 
Ossetia during the conflict.  This formal accusation had been a long time coming, 
considering Russian support. 
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Russia countered Georgian aggression with a blockade.  Moscow also wrote 
to the Bush administration stating that no former USSR states should be allowed to 
join NATO so that therefore the U.S. could not station troops in Georgia or supply 
any military infrastructure.  Both of these demands were broken within the next ten 
years.  In 2006 Russia placed economic sanctions on Georgia.  Before the sanction, 
Russia spent about $216 million on Georgian exports (Niedermaier, 2008: 254).  In 
July 2006, the Georgian police and security forces took control of the Kodori Valley, 
breaking the ceasefire agreement.  Georgia also demanded for the earliest possible 
withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the area.  Russia furthered its ties with 
South Ossetia by beginning the construction of a pipeline between North and South 
Ossetia.  This pipelined created energy security for South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 
2008: 259). 
During this time Georgia and Russia also furthered this diplomatic war by 
establishing a visa war.  Russia stopped ensuring visas to Georgian 
citizens.  Hundreds of Georgians gathered at the Russian Embassy to show protest 
because they could not visit relatives in the north.  Later, in 2007 Georgia responded 
to Russia‟s previously placed sanctions by establishing the Tangerine Embargo on 
South Ossetia.  Georgians blocked the highway and “truck drivers transporting 
tangerines”.  The struggle and combat continued as Georgian police exploded a 
Russian bombshell and Georgia accused Russia of bombing their territory “just 56 
kilometers west of the capital”. 
On November 6, 2007 thousands of Georgians peacefully rallied to overthrow 
Mikhail Saakashvili from his position as president (Niedermaier, 2008: 301).  The 
citizens were angry about the prolific corruption within the government.  The 
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Georgian government responded by violently suppressing the protesters “with billy 
clubs and tear gas” (Niedermaier, 2008: 305).  President Saakashvili announced a 
compromise solution to hold early presidential elections in 2008.  Although this is 
true, he still held a second term and continued his corrupt rule. 
In 2008 the situation within Georgia began to cool down as Georgia semi-
recognized Abkhazia and lifted economic sanctions, but this did not last 
long.  Russians “[accounted] for a majority of the South Ossetian and Abkazian 
population” because Russia had moved in so many troops (Niedermaier, 2008: 
338).  Putin also decided to annex Georgian territory and as a response Georgia 
decided to hold back and refrain from taking any steps that may agitate 
Russia.  Saakashvili continued relations with the U.N. and the E.U., by requesting 
their peacekeepers instead of Russian Peacekeepers, but Russia was prepared to 
protect Abkhazia and South Ossetia with arms.  The situation continued to heat up 
with a propelled increase of armed combat and confrontation.  Thousands of people 
were killed in Tskhinvali when Georgian troops raided the city.  At this point, South 
Ossetia stated that they were at war with Georgia. 
Commentary from Russian foreign policy elites and military experts states 
that they would continue to expand humanitarianism and cultural cooperation with 
all of the Transcaucus, after the 2008 crisis (Niedermaier, 2008: 423).  They 
generally believe in the right of nations to decide their own fate and stated that 
Russian peacekeepers were generators of peace and calm and will not leave. Russia 
is also interested in Georgian peace through economic cooperation.  They also reject 
American perusing objectives within reason and using conflict as an excuse to obtain 
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economic interests.  The potential for an economic partnership may end or decrease 
the conflict within the region. 
Currently, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have now established independent, as 
generally and functionally recognized, republics on an international 
level.  Conversely, according to Georgia and the United States, the regions are 
temporary administrative units within Georgia.  Although this is true, the intervention 
helped to resolve the conflict, and military aggression has tapered to an almost non-
existent level. The outbreak of conflict was produced by the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the nullification of the 1921 treaty.  This caused a slow disintegration that 
allowed for the South Ossetian people to gain independence as a nation from Russia 
and Georgia as controlling actors. 
6.1.2 Analysis of the Russian intervention in Georgia 
6.1.2.1 Common History 
6.1.2.1.1 Same government 
Georgia had been under the same government as Russia since it was annexed by 
Russia in 1810. In 1801 Paul I signed a contract which annexed East Georgia to 
Russia. This ended the independence of the Georgian kingdoms. Although many riots 
ensued, Georgians were finally protected from foreign attempts at conquest. Under 
Russian government, Georgians adopted a new system of taxation, education and 
Russian cultural norms. In fact ever since the early 19
th
 century Georgia experienced 
a Russification of policy, which influenced every part of Georgian society. 
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Georgia was annexed again in 1921 by the Bolsheviks. It became the 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and a process of Sovietization began in Georgia 
just as it had in other republics. Under the common Soviet government in Moscow 
Georgia underwent a process of industrialization and collectivization. It only gained 
its independence in 1991. 
 The fact that when Georgia was in the Soviet this Union could be seen as 
having a negative influence on the state. It was ruled harshly and many people were 
executed and purged under Stalin. A significant portion of its land was given to the 
Georgia‟s neighboring countries. This must have had led some people to grow 
resentful of Russian interference in Georgian affairs. When Georgians began to 
protest in favor of independence the “Soviet troops violently suppressed peaceful 
demonstrators ... resulting in 19 deaths”.2 The Georgians began to perceive the Soviet 
government as repressive and “coupled with demagogic politics on all sides, led to 
rising insecurities and perceptions of ethnic victimization” (Charap and Welt, 2011). 
 However, Soviet dominance also had a pacifying affect. During those years, 
there was very little ethnic strife. It was only in the late 1980s that Georgia began to 
push hard for independence while South Ossetians and Abhkazis preferred to stay in 
a reformed Soviet Union. It was only after Georgia‟s independence that problems 
began to emerge. It wasn‟t that these internal problems were hidden or not apparent 
on the surface, but rather carried very little significance in the context of the Soviet 
Union. Under the Soviet Union different nations were considered equal and it was 
only after Georgia gained its independence that “discriminatory nationalism” 
developed. Furthermore, under the Soviet Union all republics and nations were 
                                                 
2
 www.americanprogress.org/wp.../02/.../georgia_conflicts.pdf (Last Access 22.01.2013) 
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united under a strong and common ideology of Soviet socialism. This unifying force 
disappeared. This destabilized many societies and their political structures who were 
trying to develop their own voice and identity. These new state structures were weak 
and disorganized. 
While Georgians grew to be anti-Soviet the South Ossetians and Abhkazis as 
pro-Soviet. “Georgia claims that Russia, which brutally suppressed its own separatist 
uprising in Chechnya, backed the Ossetian and Abkhazian rebels in order to keep 
Georgia weak and dependent upon Moscow.”3 
 Yet, it would be an exaggeration to say that Georgians view Georgian-Russian 
relations negatively. It was only after the 2008 war that the number of Georgians who 
viewed Georgian-Russian relations as “good” fell below 50% as can be seen in Table 
1.0. Furthermore, “Georgians are still more likely to favor good relations with Russia 
at all ... This likely reflects the strength of Georgians' close cultural, historical, and 
economic ties to Russia.”.4 Such a statement reflects that although there have been 
problems and even violent armed conflicts between the two countries, the two 
nations continue to have positive associations of each other due to their social and 
historical ties.  
                                                 
3
 Russia-Gergia Conflict: Why both sides have valid points. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0819/p12s01-woeu.html/(page)/2 (Last Access 
22.01.2013) 
4
 Georgians‟ Attitudes Toward Russia Less Friendly Since War 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122258/georgians-attitudes-toward-russia-less-friendly-war.aspx (Last 
Access 22.01.2013) 
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Table 1.0 – Gallup‟s Survey on Georgian public opinion on Russia5 
 We must also not ignore the fact that under the Soviet Union, Georgia was 
under a lot of influence from Moscow. The Russian intervention can be seen as just 
another example of Russia expanding its influence into its neighboring periphery. It 
is easy to argue that Russians found it hard to accept that it had lost control over the 
social-economic, political and security situation of the newly independent, former 
Soviet Republics. 
6.1.2.1.2 Having an alliance or war 
Since the Middle Ages onwards the Christian Georgian kingdoms had been caught 
between three major Empires: Ottoman, Russian and Persian. It tried to resist foreign 
                                                 
5
 Georgians‟ Attitudes Toward Russia Less Friendly Since War 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122258/georgians-attitudes-toward-russia-less-friendly-war.aspx (Last 
Access 22.01.2013) 
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influence, but it remained divided into spheres of influence of the three Empires. 
Eventually it developed ever closer ties with the Russian Empire. It faced many 
defeats while battling these stronger forces and sought Russian protection, which was 
not well assured or regular. A big breakthrough was the Treaty of Georgievsk of 
1783, which made the eastern Georgian kingdom (Kartlinia-Kahetia) a protectorate 
of the Russian Empire. It was an alliance between the Georgian Kingdom and 
Catherine the Great. However, even with this treaty Russia did not follow through. It 
withdrew troops during the next Russo-Turkish war. This left Georgians vulnerable 
and they were defeated by the Iranians. 
Although the Treaty of Georgievsk was the first major alliance between the 
two nations, the 20
th
 century alliance under the USSR must have played a significant 
role in the development of identities of the two countries. After all, both lived under a 
common ideology, economic system and were ruled under a common and heavily 
centralized government. Under this alliance all Soviet republic shared the same 
friends and foes on the international level. It pulled Georgia into World War II. 
Georgia contributed soldiers of which 300,000 died. Although having a common 
enemy can be unifying, it can also be dividing. 
6.1.2.2 Language 
In Georgia the official language is Georgian and the majority of the population 
speaks it (approx. 70%). However there are many other languages, which are spoken 
in Georgia, including Russian (10 %), Armenian (7%) and others. Having a Russian 
minority within Georgia, which speaks Russian, brings the identities of the 
intervening and intervened countries closer. Russians may seem less foreign. Under 
Tsarist Russia, Georgia used Russian in school. This was abolished when Georgia 
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became a part of the Soviet Union. Having had a common history under the 
communist rule of the Soviet Union means that more than two decades ago Georgia 
was a bilingual state with Russian and Georgian as the official languages. It was in 
fact it was the national movement that brought back the Georgian language as the 
official language. 
6.1.2.2.1 Language Family 
 Georgian is considered to be in the Kartvelian language family. This language 
family is very unique and is not considered to be related to any other language 
family. Some linguists say that there is no relation to the North Caucasian language 
family. Others argue that it belongs to the Ibero-Caucasian family, while others still 
argue that the Georgian language has some similarities to Indo-European language 
family. This may just be out of geographical proximity (intermingling of different 
languages and cultures) of these languages. 
 On the other hand Russian belongs to the family of Indo-European languages. 
More specifically it falls under the Balto-Slavic group of languages. It is an East 
Slavic language. 
However, since the similarities are arguably small we can conclude that the 
two languages are part of very different language families. Although these two 
language families are not as foreign as two languages from very different parts of the 
world may be, the vague similarities may be considered insignificant in creating a 
common identity. They are simply not related enough to have any effect on the 
construction of a shared identity between the two states. 
 78 
 
6.1.2.2.2 Alphabet 
 The Georgian alphabet is different to the Russian alphabet. The alphabet that 
has been in use since the 11th century is called Mkhedruli. On the other hand, 
Russian uses the Russian alphabet, which is a version of the Cyrillic script. 
6.1.2.3 Religion 
Russia is the home to believers of many different faiths (including Islam and 
Judaism), but the most predominant religion in Russia is Orthodox Christianity. It 
has the largest number of adherents. Just like in Russia, the majority of Georgians are 
practicing Orthodox Christians. A small part of that population is even a part of the 
Russian Orthodox Church (approximately 2%). Georgia also has Muslim and Jewish 
minority groups. A common religion can definitely be taken into account as one of 
the decisive factors contributing to a common identity. 
6.1.3 Results of Russian Intervention in Georgia 
Considering the definition of success provided in previous sections, Russian 
intervention to South Ossetia can be considered a successful one. First of all, Russia 
obtained its goal of liberating South Ossetia and Abkhazia or in other words, not 
preventing Georgia from dominating these regions. Secondly, Russia‟s casualties 
were 36 soldiers and Georgia‟s causalities were 171. Estimated civilian causalities 
were 162. In total, 369 people died on both sides. Although this number seems 
relatively high, the maximum number for an intervention to fail defined earlier was 
one thousand. Thirdly, military engagement during the conflict took 9 days, after 
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which the violence stopped. In the definition, it was decided that for an intervention 
to be considered successful, it should stop the conflict for six months. Consequently, 
Russia can be said to have achieved its goal by losing relatively few soldiers and 
civilians, bringing an end to the conflict in just 9 days and moreover, ensuring this 
was an enduring solution. Therefore, this military intervention is considered as 
successful. 
6.2 British Intervention in Sierra Leone 
6.2.1 Background 
The reasons leading to Sierra Leone‟s civil war in the 1990‟s and later Great Britain‟s 
intervention in the year 2000 were largely due to elements held in the historical 
background of the region. Sierra Leone is a region that has been divided for many 
centuries by differing ethnic groups after over 2000 years of migratory peoples 
coming to the region. During the time of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the indigenous 
peoples consisted of at least fourteen ethno-linguistic groups. While the majority of 
these groups adhered to traditional parochial socio-economic systems governed by 
kinship rules, later it evolved into a paramount chief system (Hirsch, 2001: 22). 
These are elements that have divided the country and have therefore weakened it as 
well. Additional factors contributing to the diversity of the area include the coming 
of Islamic peoples in the thirteenth century through the seventeenth century as well 
as the coming of the British in the seventeenth century. The appearance of these 
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groups had inevitably affected the indigenous peoples as well as their way of life, 
stability and belief systems. 
Fortunately for the indigenous peoples of Sierra Leone, the British took 
action in the late 1700s to block the immense slave trade to the Americas by other 
European countries and established Freetown for freed slaves. This was Britain‟s first 
involvement, later making Sierra Leone one of its colonies in 1808. However, 
Britain‟s efforts did not stop Portuguese involvement in the area. Portuguese 
influence mainly affected the indigenous people of Sierra Leone through inter-
marriage, a race later named Creole or Krio. Due to the European connections these 
people were despised by the indigenous again contributing to conflicts within Sierra 
Leone. Because of this European connection, the Krio population was appointed 
governmental positions later creating corruption. The British declared areas of Sierra 
Leone outside of Freetown as a protectorate in 1896 with aims to protect the region 
under its colonial rule. 
The British granted independence to the whole of Sierra Leone in 1961 on the 
assumption that it was a healthy and prosperous state in the process of transforming 
into a modernized state. However, due to the great class separation and its past 
history, there was a great deal of resistance from the impoverished warrior class and 
inharmonious diversity leading up to the civil war of the 1900s. A lack of central 
government aided the resistance of smaller ethnic groups that indirectly ruled the 
protectorate. It was at this time that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels 
took advantage of the corrupt and decentralized government of Sierra Leone to 
invade the region in 1991 using tactics of shock and terror (Hirsch, 2001: 81). These 
elements are the causes of the decline of the state and the civil war of Sierra Leone. 
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In current times, Sierra Leone aims to rebuild and mollify the tragic decade-
long war it has endured. However, even after the British intervention, there is still 
violence occurring characterizing a tenuous unrest. 
6.2.2 Analysis of British Intervention in Sierra Leone  
6.2.2.1 Common History 
6.2.2.1.1 Same government 
Sierra Leone was previously under the British rule. As was explained in the theory 
section colonial rule can also be counted as peoples being ruled by the same 
government, as it may produce the sentiment of belonging among all of its subjects, 
even if they are unequal in their status. An Empire might not unify all of its subjects 
under one identity and the British practiced „indirect rule‟ in most of their colonies, 
so its influence is slightly less obvious. Even though the British ruled indirectly, the 
British officials and citizens living abroad (along with local sympathetic and 
cooperative citizens) were much more privileged than other local and indigenous 
people. 
The British first became involved in Sierra Leone was in 1663 and they 
established a factory. The British presence in Sierra Leone was based on British 
interest for economic growth ever since. It was under British influence in 1826. The 
British military began to exert its will on tribal leaders. In 1896 it became official 
British soil with an official proclamation. So, did the British have a positive or 
negative effect on the relations between the British and the people of Sierra Leone? 
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Since 1807 the British made slavery and the slave trade illegal. This could 
have had a positive effect on the Sierra Leonean perception of the colonizers as they 
were able to see the worth and value of the people treating them with greater dignity 
than otherwise. Sierra Leone was termed “Province of Freedom”. Many Black slaves 
were brought to Sierra Leone to free them and although some eventually rebelled, 
this can be seen as a positive effect. 
Until the 20
th
 century Britain continued to gradually increase its involvement 
in Sierra Leonean affairs, slowly taking over control of the territory by ruling through 
tribal chiefs. They attempted to secure peace between the tribes in order to maintain a 
prosperous trade. They continued to collect financial sources, like customs duties 
from the tribes in exchange for maintaining peace and trade. The negative aspect of 
this colonization was that the tribal chiefs were forced into such unequal relations. 
Although nominally this relation appeared equal as contracts were signed between 
both equal and sovereign parties. This could have had a positive effect. 
Whether the colonial rule was positive or negative is considered by this thesis 
as irrelevant. There are examples where imperial rule was very friendly and positive 
for the ruled populations and they will be viewed the rule negatively (for example the 
Ottoman in the Balkans). What is important is that the British rule was long and 
British colonial influence was present in Sierra Leone for a long period of time and 
might even be continuing. 
 One of the strongest pieces of evidence of „same government‟ factors is that 
Sierra Leone became a Commonwealth state even after it gained its independence 
contributing to good relations with United Kingdom. 
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6.2.2.1.2 Alliance and War 
The British protected their trading interests by defending the territory against the 
Dutch and French as well as pirates in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century. While this could 
have brought the two peoples closer together by being positioned on the same side of 
conflicts and yet, the British also had to fight with local tribal groups and chiefs 
when they rebelled putting them on opposing sides of conflicts. 
Then during World War II the British conscripted many Sierra Leonean 
soldiers and used the tribal chiefs as a mechanism of persuading local men to join the 
war effort. They fought alongside the British soldiers in Burma. They even 
distributed some propaganda showing the people of Sierra Leone what life under 
Nazism could be like. Such efforts must have created a closer tie between the two 
entities, because people with a common enemy tend to become closer even if they 
are very different. 
6.2.2.1.3 International events 
An important early event was the abolition of slavery and Britain‟s efforts to 
internationalize this anti-slavery movement. However, this event could be understood 
as irrelevant due to the fact that it is far from being current and may have no real 
effect on the mass memory of the Sierra Leonean people. Such a link would need to 
be investigated further. 
One of the main events in Sierra Leone‟s history is its independence from 
Great Britain in 1961. The fact that the independence took place relatively easily and 
peacefully must have had a contributing impact on bringing the two nations closer 
together. Independence was negotiated in Britain between a Sierra Leonean 
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delegation and the British. Unlike other African states Sierra Leone did not have to 
fight a long and bloody battle. Such an independence process could have 
permanently scarred the relations between the two countries. 
6.2.2.2 Language 
The official language in Sierra Leone is English, and it is clearly an inheritance of 
British colonial rule. However, while we can state that Sierra Leone and Britain share 
a common language (and therefore also a language from the same family tree and 
alphabet) the thesis recognizes that the official language is only spoken by a literate 
minority and there are many languages spoken by the local people such as: Mende, 
Temne and Krio. These are the languages spoken by the majority of the population, 
while English is only used in small numbers. 
What this all actually means is that we can claim that the two countries share 
a common language, but we must be aware of limited use of English and how this 
affects the common identity assumption. If only the educated elites of Sierra Leone 
speak English we can hypothesize whether they are more willing to feel closer to or 
identify themselves with the British. Its positive effect on identity may exist, but it is 
restricted. 
6.2.2.3 Religion 
Islam spread to Sierra Leone in the 19
th
 century and remained a prominent religion 
ever since, even with the British occupation and all its cultural influences. Over 60% 
of the population is Muslim, while only 20-30% of the population subscribes to 
Christianity. While this may seem like a small number, I would argue that the number 
does provide Sierra Leone with an opportunity to coexist with this religious 
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affiliation, rather than view it as a distant, foreign and unknown belief system. There 
are also other religions present in Sierra Leone. The constitution of Sierra Leone 
provides for religious freedom. This provides Sierra Leone with an environment of 
religious tolerance rather than intolerance. The thesis therefore adopts the assumption 
that the British intervention was not viewed in terms of a religious crusade or as an 
example of Christian western interference. 
6.2.3 Results of British Intervention in Sierra Leone 
As has been demonstrated by the background section of the British intervention in 
Sierra Leone, the British intervention was successful, despite the initial US, British 
and French doubts over the outcome after “Black Hawk Down”. Britain started to 
deploy soldiers in May, mission was mostly completed by September. In five months, 
civil war was stopped which means that Britain achieved the original purpose of the 
intervention by suffering slightly small casualties both civilian and military. 
Considering all these, British intervention in Sierra Leone has been a successful one. 
6.3 USA intervention in Somalia 
6.3.1 Background 
The Somali civil war is a current civil conflict, initiated by the defeat of the military 
government. In 1991 an alliance of clan-lords ousted the Siad Barre regime, resulting 
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in full governmental collapse. After this military government instantly dissolved, 
conflict and armed war broke out between multiple powerful clan-lords. In pursuit of 
territory and power, these clan-based armed opposition groups used ethnic 
mobilization to secure the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre‟s ruling socialist government. 
His regime lasted about 13 years after it was established in 1978, as a result of a coup 
d'état (Allard, 1995). The United Nations attempted at an intervention in 1992, but 
was unable to improve the countries situation and thus aborted the mission. The 
UN‟s ineffective operation left Somalia without relief or conclusion to the warfare. 
Currently, Somalia remains engaged in a costly Civil War, eliminating more citizen 
freedoms and contributing to a high death toll. 
It is the general conception of most academics that the United Nations failed 
at a peacekeeping attempt. This is based on the fact that after the UN had an, “initial 
success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives” but 
later, “American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the 
spring of 1994” (Allard, 1995). This failure gave way to a lack of central authority 
and created a power gap and an extensive rivalry between armed groups. Battles 
between clan lords struggling for influence in the region emerged from a power gap 
in central authority. An inevitable decentralization of power catalyzed the appearance 
of small territorial authorities. Many newly established authorities adopted several 
different forms of personal government, including old traditions and religious law 
such as Sharia Law. 
In order to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia, the 
United Nations commissioned the „UNOSOM I‟ project to provide humanitarian 
relief. The council issued two resolutions: UN Security Council Resolution 773 and 
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UN Security Council Resolution 746. In addition, Resolution 794 sent United States 
led troops as the first troops assigned to land in Somalia territory. The Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) was given the duty of guaranteeing the UN‟s humanitarian relief 
reached the Somali people, until the conflict stabilize. The first troops landed in 1993 
under the operation name UNOSOM II. Chronologically speaking, the U.S. military 
forces went through three distinct phases during the period of providing humanitarian 
assistance (Allard, 1995). First, an airlift provided food relief and medical supplies to 
the citizens of Somalia who were in dire need; the causes of the need ranged from 
sickness to starvation. The second phase of the operation comprised of an 
intervention force that combined both continued humanitarian relief and better 
security forces intended to protect those providing the assistance. The final wave of 
US aid operation was essentially troops, providing the majority of combat power. 
This is an important undertaking historically, because it was the first “peace 
enforcement” operation conducted by the United Nations (Allard, 1995). All of these 
efforts proved to unsuccessful during and after the relief effort. 
United States forces were not welcomed by civilians or local leaders and 
furthermore were perceived as a threat by clan lords and local leaders, who were 
struggling for power. Several battles took place between UN assigned US forces and 
Somalia militia, including the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. With massive amounts 
of causalities on both sides and with the fact that the purpose of intervention could 
not achieved, UN troops withdrew from Somalia in 1995. Today there is a 
continuous conflict between the Transitional Federal Government, which is 
supported by Ethiopia and other multinational forces against Islamic Courts Union, 
which is formed by Islamic groups including some radical groups like Al-Shabaab. 
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Domestic and international military aid and force have been unable to put an end to 
this enduring conflict (Allard, 1995). 
The impacts of the long lasting civil war were exceedingly destructive. The 
people of Somali are still struggling with drought and famine as well as violence 
resulting from the conflict. Moreover, the conflict drove large numbers of civilians 
from their homes to refugee camps in Somalia and other countries. Most of the 
recently displaced Somalis “have taken shelter in and around the Kenyan town of 
Mandera”.6 Although the United Nation‟s attempted to achieve relief by sending 
humanitarian aid, most of the aid did not reach people. Clan lords instead seized the 
food, medicine, and other supplies. Many years under these harsh conditions brought 
crushing poverty, a continuously increasing death toll, and other forms of violence 
against and between the Somali people. 
6.3.2 Analysis of USA intervention in Somalia 
6.3.2.1 Common History 
6.3.2.1.1 Same Government 
Unlike the case of Britain and Sierra Leone, Somalia and USA have never had a 
shared history in colonial terms. Somalia was split into British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland and both Empires fought for power and influence. After World War II 
Britain established Somaliland as a protectorate. Italy was granted a trusteeship over 
                                                 
6
 UNHCR Refugees Daily. 2011 “Somalia's civil war” The Economist. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4d9577495 (Last Access 22.01.2013) 
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Italian Somaliland by the UN. In the period leading up to its independence USA 
played no significant role in Somalia‟s history. From the period of 1969 to 1991 
Somalia was a democratic communist regime. For approximately a decade since the 
establishment of Somali Democratic Republic it had good relations with the Soviet 
Union. Ideologically and historically the two states were far from having a common 
history or identity. In fact, they were on polar opposite sides during the Cold War. 
The cooperation between Somali and Soviet Union did not last long, because 
of the Ogaden War. USA had always been interested in Somalia, because of its 
geostrategic significance at the horn of Africa as an entryway to the Red Sea and the 
Suez Canal. It received military support from the USA and became one of the most 
powerful armies on the African continent. However once the Somali civil war began 
in 1990 the US embassy in Somalia ceased its work without formally ending 
diplomatic relations with the country. Instead it continued its relations with the 
Somali state through humanitarian efforts. While the US supports the transitional 
government it encourages a sustainable peace process with the end result of a newly 
elected and representative parliament and the creation of a constitution. 
6.3.2.2 Language 
The USA and Somalia do not share a common language. The official Somali 
language is the Somali language. The majority of the population speaks this 
language. The Somali children who did/do attend school are also taught Arabic, 
English or Italian. Arabic is taught as a second language due to Islam being a 
predominant religion in the country. Many children attend Quranic schools. Italian is 
taught because Italian influences are a colonial left-over. English is taught because 
there are benefits to learning a language spoken by the majority of the world as a 
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second language and being able to integrate with the rest of the world. However, 
Arabic is preferred by the majority of the Somali population. 
6.3.2.2.1 Alphabet 
Somalia has a complicated background of different languages and different 
alphabets. Four different alphabets were used until 1961, when only two were used, 
one of them being the Latin alphabet. It was only in 1972 that the Latin alphabet was 
used. This means that Somalia and USA share the same alphabet. However, it is 
possible to argue that this contributes very little to a common or shared identity. A 
common alphabet is only a recent characteristic. 
6.3.2.3 Religion 
Somalia and USA do not share a common religion. Somalia is predominantly Sunni 
Muslim. The majority of Somali Muslims also subscribe to Shafi‟i sect of Islamic 
law, while others agree with Shia law. Even the constitution of Somalia confirms that 
Islam is the national religion of the state of Somalia. It also states that Sharia law is 
the basic source of morality and legislation for the state of Somalia. Islam has been 
popular in Somalia during its very early stages and has been a very important societal 
and cultural force in the country. Christians in Somalia are only a minority, with less 
than 1,000 adherents and they came to Somalia only recently from the British 
Somaliland protectorate. There are also some animists. 
On the other hand, USA is predominantly Christian at 76% of the population. 
The population of USA is divided into many different religious affiliations as well as 
levels of belief. Not all religious Americans put religion as a top preoccupation or 
priority in their life. Also, people in some parts of USA tend to be more religious 
than others. Western coastal states for example have a great number of people who 
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do not subscribe to any religious affiliation and do not believe in God, while people 
in the so-called „Bible Belt‟ tend to be deeply religious Christians. 
Apart from Christians and not-religious people, Jews and Muslims form a 
significant minority group. There are approximately two and a half million Muslims 
(about 0.8 % of the population). While the first Muslims came into the USA as 
African slaves and have generally been able to integrate into the multicultural state, 
since 9/11 Muslims have been stereotyped, stigmatized and marginalized in 
American society. 
It is clear that the intervening and intervened state have very different 
religious affiliations, although they both belong to Abrahamic religions. It is possible 
to assume that the two societies have had very little contact with the other‟s religions 
at a national level as they are both minority religions. 
6.3.3 Results of USA intervention in Somalia 
The main participant in this intervention was clearly the USA backed up by the UN 
and states who contributed troops. The US played a major role in the intervention, 
that is why this thesis has focused on their identity the identity of the USA and 
Somalia. It was the USA that offered to create a multilateral body that would operate 
under its own leadership and finally provide Somalia with the humanitarian relief it 
needed from war, destruction and poverty. Once the plans were approved by the UN 
Security Council, the body was called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The USA 
was in charge of commanding the troops during Operation Restore Hope along with 
troops from Australia, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Ireland, India, Turkey, New 
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Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia and 12 other countries. However the 
majority of the troops were American (25,000 out of 37,000). UNITAF did not seem 
to reach the proposed goals and its mission was transformed by the UN into 
UNOSOM II. US troops were in Somalia for 2 years between 1992-1994 in order to 
ensure humanitarian aid went through insurgent groups to people in need. During 
these 2 years, the US suffered almost 20 causalities and there are estimated 1500 
civilian causalities on the Somali side. Furthermore, when the US left Somalia, the 
original problem remained. This intervention took more than 6 months and could not 
stop civilian deaths, nor did the US did achieve its intervention objectives. During 
this operation, and estimated 1500 people died, which is much higher than the 
maximum casualty rate given in the definition of a successful intervention. 
Therefore, the US intervention to Somalia is considered as unsuccessful. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
 
All three intervention cases were analyzed using the theory in order to underline 
possible relationship between identity and success of interventions. The scope of the 
research does not include all other components of success of intervention, but only 
identity, as this research attempted to show that the identity of parties in an 
intervention may affect the success of intervention. Moreover, due to limited time 
and limited research capabilities the theory could not be applied to more than three 
cases. Ideally, every military intervention after the Second World War could be 
explored using this theory and such extensive research would strengthen the theory. 
The first intervention case analyzed was Russian military intervention to Georgia is 
considered as a successful intervention. Although it is unknown how effective the 
components of identity (history, religion, language) are compared to each other, it 
was the first example of successful intervention taking part between parties that have 
similar identities. The example of Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone was 
successful as well. Britain and Sierra Leone were more different in terms of 
similarities mentioned in this thesis comparing to Russia and Georgia‟s similarities. 
Britain's colonial relations are relatively more recent than Russia's for example. 
However, their identities were similar enough to stop the intervened resisting against 
intervener party. For the third example however, it is seen that both of the parties 
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have really different identities and no commonalities at all, making mobilization 
efforts against interveners easier for local political actors and power holders in 
Somalia. It is possible that the USA's loss of casualties was not too severe, but 
resistance against US operations was so powerful that US became dysfunctional and 
was forced to kill civilians to carry out basic operations. It is obvious that US forces 
in the region were alienated in the eyes of local people, as if they were there to 
invade their land or/and harm them.  
The main argument of this thesis is that the similarity of identity between 
intervener and intervening parties reduces this alienation and allows intervening 
troops to carry out their operations in peace. All of the intervention cases analyzed in 
this thesis show that the more similar the identities are, the more successful the 
intervention is.   
7.1 Future of the Research 
There are three main research possibilities for future. The first one is, as 
aforementioned, the number of cases. Ideally, this theory should be applied to all of 
the military intervention cases which happened after the Second World War, in order 
to test the relationship between identity and success of intervention. This would 
provide better evidence for the theory and clear the way of extending the theory to 
other inter-identity encounter such as wars, immigration and refugee issues be 
considered as the second future research possibility. 
Since the most basic element of a military intervention is an encounter 
between two different groups within a specific context, these encounters might be 
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varied. Refugee issues are one of them. It is a humanitarian issue and always difficult 
to handle for hosting states. Not every state accepts refugees from every other state. 
There are conditions for hosting refugees. The role of identity as one of these 
conditions could be considered by this theory in further research.  Examples of 
encounters can be varied. 
Thirdly, the theory itself can be extended in terms of components of identity. 
Right now there are three main components of identity including, common history, 
language and religion. However, ethnicity and political belongings might be added to 
the theory. Although political conflicts are not as common as they were during the 
Cold War. It is known as communism and was a major identity element which caused 
many conflicts between groups. Moreover, communism was the dominant identity 
element that neutralized religion and even common history for many people. Besides, 
if Sierra Leone example was analyzed including the political identity factor, I believe 
we might be able to trace effects of anti-colonialism on identities of people. 
Therefore, adding political identity as a factor could provide areas for further 
research and even more commonalities in the connection between identity and 
intervention success. 
7.2 Conclusion 
International military interventions might be the most frequently used method which 
involves weapon employment and causes loss of human life. Thus, it is a delicate 
matter and is studied further in order to minimize pecuniary loss and intangible 
damages by making it more successful. The factors which define the success of 
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military intervention are various. It is certain that these factors either are not 
investigated enough or ignored by policy makers. Either way, considering the current 
political situation where it is argued that civilizations clash with each other, identity 
should be taking into consideration. In this thesis, the concept of identity and 
intervention as inter-related groups is discussed, and a successful intervention was 
defined. The main purpose was to understand if there is a link between the identity 
element of intervener and intervened groups and more importantly, if this affects the 
success of intervention. In order to investigate this relationship, a framework of 
social-political identity that aims to reveal similarities and differences was created 
and applied to three different international military intervention cases. Application of 
this framework to cases shows that the more similar the identities of intervener and 
intervened are, intervention is more likely to be successful. 
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